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Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review
abstract. Current conceptions of “arbitrary and capricious” review focus on whether
agencies have adequately explained their decisions in statutory, factual, scientific, or otherwise
technocratic terms. Courts, agencies, and scholars alike, accordingly, generally have accepted the
notion that influences from political actors, including the President and Congress, cannot
properly help to explain administrative action for purposes of arbitrary and capricious review.
This means that agencies today tend to sweep political influences under the rug even when such
influences offer the most rational explanation for the action. This Article argues that this picture
should change.
Specifically, this Article argues for expanding current conceptions of arbitrary and
capricious review beyond a singular technocratic focus so that credit would also be awarded to
certain political influences that an agency transparently discloses and relies upon in its
rulemaking record. Such an expansion of arbitrary and capricious review could yield many
benefits. First, it would help to bring arbitrary and capricious review into harmony with other
major doctrines, such as Chevron deference, that seem to embrace the “political control” model of
agency decisionmaking. Second, it could help to create a more effective separation between
science and politics. Third, giving politics a place could give courts another reason to defer to
agencies, thereby softening the “ossification” charge frequently levied against arbitrary and
capricious review. Finally, such a change would facilitate greater political accountability and
monitoring.
Ultimately, whether an expanded conception of arbitrary and capricious review can be
attained will rest in the hands of courts and agencies. Agencies would need to begin openly
acknowledging political influences, and courts would need to become comfortable
acknowledging that an agency’s reliance on political influences involving policy considerations
and value judgments, such as a President’s desire to push a specific environmental issue to the
top of the EPA’s priority list, might help legitimize an agency’s decision. This Article suggests
that courts and agencies might be most comfortable first making this move in narrow contexts,
such as decisions to deny discretionary rulemaking petitions.
author. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Many thanks
to Bill Andersen, Jack Beermann, Clark Lombardi, Tom Merrill, Sallie Sanford, Jim Speta, Peter
Strauss, and Amy Wildermuth for helpful comments and also to participants in a faculty
workshop at the University of Washington. Also thanks to Rachel King and Marissa Olsson for
excellent research assistance.
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introduction
At its core, arbitrary and capricious review, or “hard look” review as it is
sometimes called, enables courts to ensure that administrative agencies justify
their decisions with adequate reasons.1 Although existing case law does not
always make it easy to separate reasons that “adequately” support an agency
decision from those that are “inadequate,”2 the Supreme Court’s famous 1983
decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co.3 has been read to clarify one important aspect of arbitrary and
capricious review: agencies should explain their decisions in technocratic,
statutory, or scientifically driven terms, not political terms.4

1.

2.

3.
4.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that agencies act in a manner that passes
“arbitrary and capricious” review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). The term “hard look”
review developed in the D.C. Circuit as a judicial gloss on the meaning of the APA’s
arbitrary and capricious test. See Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the
Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599 (2002); see also
infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text (discussing the development of hard look review).
Even though hard look review calls for a more searching and less deferential type of judicial
review than section 706(2)(A) may have originally contemplated, see infra notes 44-52 and
accompanying text, this Article uses the terms hard look review and arbitrary and capricious
review interchangeably to refer to the reason-giving requirement that agencies now face
under the modern reading of section 706(2)(A). In other words, this Article does not
attempt to attack the existence of hard look review per se, but rather suggests a modification
of hard look review.
As Professor Richard Pierce has aptly explained, “adequacy is in the eye of the beholder,”
which makes it quite difficult for agencies to predict whether or not a court will deem an
agency’s explanation to be sufficient. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 84-85
(2008).
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 183 (1990) (noting that State Farm “entails a conception of politics as
distinguishable from and in opposition to the required rationality of agency decision
making”); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 226
(1990) (“[T]he submerged yet powerful message in the Supreme Court’s decision in State
Farm [was] that the political directions of a particular administration are inadequate to
justify regulatory policy.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246,
2381 (2001) (describing how State Farm demanded that the agency “justify its decision in
neutral, expertise-laden terms to the fullest extent possible”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Story of
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.: Law, Science and Politics in the Administrative State, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
STORIES 335, 335 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (noting that in State Farm, “politics and
ideology were required to take a backseat to administrative law’s demand for reasoned
policy judgment”); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 307 n.191 (2006) (noting that State Farm now serves as “common
contemporary shorthand for the requirement that agencies rationalize their decisions in
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In State Farm, the Court reviewed a decision made by the new Reagan
Administration’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
to rescind a rule previously promulgated under the Carter Administration that
required certain cars to be equipped with either air bags or automatic seat
belts.5 In a partial dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist openly noted that the
NHTSA’s changed views seemed “to be related to the election of a new
President,” which Rehnquist viewed as “a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and
regulations.”6 The majority, however, skipped over the political context of the
decision,7 and it instead focused on the technocratic justifications that the
NHTSA offered to support its rule rescission.8 The Court’s singular focus in
State Farm on technocratic justifications, accordingly, has been widely read to
represent the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of politics in administrative
decisionmaking.9
Ever since the Court handed down State Farm, agencies, courts, and
scholars alike generally seem to have accepted the view that influences coming
from one political branch or another cannot be allowed to explain
administrative decisionmaking, even if such factors are influencing agency
decisionmaking. Take agencies to begin with. Agencies today generally try to
meet their reason-giving duties under State Farm by couching their decisions in
technocratic, statutory, or scientific language, either failing to disclose or
affirmatively hiding political factors that enter into the mix. A good example of
this can be found by looking at the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
attempt in the 1990s to regulate teen smoking. Even though President Clinton
played a very active role in directing the rulemaking (going so far as to
personally announce the final rule in a Rose Garden ceremony), the FDA’s
statement of basis and purpose accompanying the final rule relied upon

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

6

terms of statutory criteria, and that a change of administration is not a sufficient basis for
agency action”).
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 32-38.
Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
A likely explanation for this is that even the NHTSA itself did not openly seek to explain its
decision based on political considerations.
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-57; see also Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and
Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 297, 310 (2004) (“Justice White did not contradict
Justice Rehnquist’s description of the political setting or conclude that it was outweighed by
other factors. Rather, he ignored it altogether, implicitly deeming the politics of the
rescission simply irrelevant.”).
See supra note 4; see also infra Section I.A. (discussing the State Farm decision).
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statutory, scientific, and expert justifications—barely even hinting at President
Clinton’s role in the rulemaking.10
Judicial review of agency action is similarly technocratic in focus. Courts
applying arbitrary and capricious review today routinely search agency
decisions to ensure they represent expert-driven decisionmaking.11 Decisions
from the D.C. Circuit, for example, borrow from State Farm’s language and
repeatedly frame arbitrary and capricious review in expert-driven terms, asking
whether the agency “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”12
In terms of scholarly attention to the issue, a few scholars have given some
attention to how arbitrary and capricious review might take politics into
account.13 For the most part, however, the blanket rejection of politics in
administrative decisionmaking has been casually accepted as the status quo by
courts, agencies, and scholars alike. The result is that insufficient attention has
been given to exploring whether political factors ought to be allowed to validly
explain agency rulemaking decisions as a normative matter and what concrete
alterations might be made to existing arbitrary and capricious review doctrine
to embrace a proper, even if limited, place for politics.

10.

11.

12.

13.

See Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 965-67 (1997)
(describing Clinton’s active involvement in the FDA’s tobacco rulemaking); see also infra
notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA’s rulemaking proceeding).
See Kagan, supra note 4, at 2270 (noting that courts “requir[e] that agency action bear the
indicia of essentially apolitical, ‘expert’ process and judgment”); see also infra Section I.A.
(describing the judicial search for technocratic decisionmaking by agencies).
Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy v. DEA, 509 F.3d 541, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(drawing on State Farm).
See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 9, 59, 66, 170-94 (1990) (arguing that present judicial doctrine
demonstrates an ineffectual ambivalence toward politics); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS
THE GUARDIANS: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 171 (1988) (arguing that judges
incorrectly treat agencies engaged in rulemaking as if the agencies are “bodies engaged in a
true science of synoptic public administration” and that judges instead should treat agencies
as “subordinate legislatures making a good deal of law within broad congressional
constraints and in the face of considerable uncertainty about facts and diverse and changing
political sentiments”); Kagan, supra note 4, at 2381-82; see also infra Section I.C. (describing
scholarly attention given to the place of politics in agency decisionmaking).

7
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This Article aims to give some much needed attention to the topic.14
Specifically, this Article seeks to identify those rulemaking proceedings in
which agencies acting as “mini legislatures” might most appropriately rely
upon political influences coming from the President, other members of the
executive branch, or Congress to justify agency decisions for purposes of
arbitrary and capricious review.15 The heart of the argument set forth here is
that what count as “valid” reasons under arbitrary and capricious review
should be expanded to include certain political influences from the President,
other executive officials, and members of Congress, so long as the political
influences are openly and transparently disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking
record. This means that the term “political influences,” as used in this Article,
refers to influences aimed at agencies coming from executive and legislative
actors, including the President, members of Congress, and those who speak for

14.

15.

8

This Article analyzes only the appropriate place of politics when an agency acts through
rulemaking and thus does not deal with adjudication. There are two reasons for focusing
exclusively on rulemaking. The first is practical: limiting the reach of this Article to the role
of politics in rulemaking helps to make the scope and breadth of the topic more manageable.
The second reason is more substantive: agencies play very different roles when engaging in
rulemaking vs. adjudication. In the rulemaking context, agencies act as mini legislatures,
whereas agencies act as mini courts in the adjudicatory context. This distinction may well
demand a different role for politics in rulemaking vs. adjudication. Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (distinguishing between agency adjudication, which
resembles judicial action, and informal rulemaking of a policymaking sort, which does not
implicate the same notions of due process). I, however, leave the answer to that question to
another day—focusing only on rulemaking in this Article.
This Article focuses on arbitrary and capricious review and thus does not directly propose
changes to other judicial review doctrines, such as Step Two of Chevron. In this sense, this
Article proceeds under the understanding that arbitrary and capricious review and Step Two
of Chevron deference are distinct in what they require—meaning that Chevron
“reasonableness,” which is used to test the fit of an agency’s interpretation with a statute,
does not equate to State Farm “reason giving,” which is used to assess the rationality of an
agency’s reasoning process. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 1001 n.4 (2005) (differentiating between Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and
capricious analysis in noting that inconsistency in an agency’s position “bears on whether
the Commission has given a reasoned explanation for its current position, not on whether
its interpretation is consistent with the statute” under Chevron). There are, however, some
scholars (as well as judicial opinions) that support the view that Step Two of Chevron
merges with arbitrary and capricious review. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util.
Comm’rs v. ICC, 41 F.3d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 872
F.2d 1048, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two
Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The
Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 827-28 (1990). If this view equating
Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and capricious review were to be accepted, then the
proposals set forth here would have implications for Step Two of Chevron as well.
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and act for the President (such as the President’s Chief of Staff and the head of
the Office of Management and Budget).
Acceptance of the argument set forth here would not mean that any and all
political influences would be allowed to legitimize agency action. Rather, some
political influences should be read to justify agency action whereas other
political influences should be read to corrupt. Although drawing a precise line
between permissible and impermissible influences is difficult, legitimate
political influences can roughly be thought of as those influences that seek to
further policy considerations or public values, whereas illegitimate political
influences can be thought of as those that seek to implement raw politics or
partisan politics unconnected in any way to the statutory scheme being
implemented. This would mean, for example, that the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) would be allowed to rely upon a public statement
issued by President Obama articulating his pro-choice agenda and his prochoice policy initiatives if HHS chose to rescind a Bush-era rule that forbids
medical facilities that receive federal money from discriminating against health
care providers who refuse, on religious grounds, to perform abortions.16
Conversely, it would mean that HHS could not legitimately justify a decision
to rescind the same Bush-era “provider conscience” rule by simply saying:
“President Obama directed us to rescind the rule in order to reward various
pro-choice organizations for their endorsement of him during his campaign.”
Three recent developments highlight the timeliness and significance of this
Article’s exploration of the proper role of politics. First, we are still in the early
stages of a new presidential administration as President Obama settles into the
White House and seeks to reprioritize agency goals.17 Shortly after winning the
election in November 2008, then-President-elect Obama made clear that he
had asked his transition team to begin reviewing the federal agencies and

16.

17.

See generally Laura Meckler, Bush-Era Abortion Rules Face Possible Reversal, WALL ST. J., Dec.
17, 2008, at A5 (describing the so-called “provider conscience” rule); Robert Pear, Obama
Will Ease Restraints on States’ Health Insurance Programs for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2009, at A25 (reporting that Obama has said that “he objects to a last-minute Bush
administration rule that grants sweeping new protections to health workers who refuse to
help perform abortions, dispense contraceptives or provide other care because of their
‘religious beliefs or moral convictions’”).
See generally Sam Kalen, Changing Administrations and Environmental Guidance Documents, 35
ECOLOGY L.Q. 657, 659 (2008) (“With each new election cycle, the ability of the executive
branch to influence policy on the myriad of issues—such as climate change—will surface. . . .
[T]he modern administrative law state assumes that federal agencies will be imbued with
the political philosophy of any new president and that they enjoy sufficient flexibility to
develop and change policy.”).

9

WATTS_119_2.DOC

the yale law journal

119:2

2009

considering changes to be made.18 In particular, President Obama has made it
clear that he will order federal departments and agencies to act in ways that will
promote energy efficiency and proenvironmental goals,19 and he has indicated
his desire to implement a shift away from deregulation toward more proactive
government regulation, largely as a response to the recent economic crisis.20
These and other impending changes that will be implemented under the new
administration point out the need to better understand whether and when it is
appropriate for agencies to justify certain decisions based on political
influences, such as campaign promises or presidential priorities.21
Second, the Supreme Court recently issued two divided decisions that
highlight the need to better understand whether politics should be given an
accepted role in agency decisionmaking. In one decision issued in 2009, FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Court reviewed the FCC’s change in its policy
involving the broadcasting of fleeting expletives.22 In upholding the FCC’s new
policy that fleeting expletives can be actionable, Justice Scalia’s opinion seemed
comfortable with the fact that the FCC’s policy change was “spurred by
significant political pressure from Congress.”23 In fact, Justice Scalia’s opinion,
which rejects the notion that agency change must be subjected to more
searching judicial review, arguably makes it easier for agencies to change their
policies due to changes in the political wind.24 In contrast, in a dissenting
opinion, Justice Breyer argued that existing law does not permit the FCC to

18.

19.
20.

21.

22.
23.
24.

10

See Meckler, supra note 16; Peter Nicholas & Christi Parsons, Obama Plans a Swift Start, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009, at A1; Editorial, Undoing the Damage Done, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009,
at WK9; Jeff Zeleny, Obama Reviewing Bush’s Use of Executive Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2008, at A19.
John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama’s Order Likely To Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2009, at A1.
See Kevin G. Hall & Margaret Talev, Obama to Financial Sector: More Regulation Is Coming,
NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 10, 2008, at 1A; cf. Jackie Calmes, Both Sides of the Aisle See More
Regulation, and Not Just of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A15 (reporting that the “proregulation climate will probably spill over into other sectors” outside of just the financial
industries and that “the political fallout of this renewed respect for government regulation is
evidenced in the current election campaigns”).
President Obama made many campaign promises, a number of which involve
administrative regulations and/or administrative agencies. See generally Robert Farley &
Angie Drobnic Holan, 510 Campaign Promises and We’re Watching, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2009, at A1 (noting that Obama’s campaign promises call for “more regulation, new
agencies and at least 11 new groups that would have ‘corps’ in their name”).
129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
Id. at 1815-16. Justice Scalia was joined in this Part of the opinion only by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito—not by Justice Kennedy.
Id. at 1810.
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“make policy choices for purely political reasons.”25 The split decision in Fox,
accordingly, opens the door for more discussion about the proper role of
politics.
In the other recent decision—the Court’s 2007 “global warming” decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA—the Court reviewed the EPA’s denial of a rulemaking
petition that asked the EPA to regulate certain emissions from new motor
vehicles that lead to global warming.26 In a split 5-4 decision, the Court rejected
the EPA’s reasons for declining to regulate and sent the EPA back to the
drawing board, embracing an expertise-driven notion of agency
decisionmaking akin to what State Farm has been read to have embraced some
twenty years earlier.27
Although newspapers across the country immediately trumpeted the
Massachusetts decision as a blockbuster case,28 the ramifications of the decision
continue to unfold. After the Court’s decision came down in April 2007, the
EPA went back to the drawing board, concluding that motor vehicle emissions
do endanger the public health and welfare and that they should be regulated.29
Based on this conclusion, the EPA sent a draft of proposed rules that would
have regulated the emissions to the White House’s Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for review in December 2007.30 OMB, however, reportedly
chose to sit on the proposed rules, going so far as to tell EPA officials that it
would not even open the EPA’s email message containing the proposed rules.31
It was not until July 2008, after much back and forth between the EPA and the

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

30.

31.

Id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
549 U.S. 497, 511-12 (2007).
See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 54 (2007).
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power To Act on Harmful Gases, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A1; Michael Hawthorne, EPA Must Regulate Greenhouse Gases, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 3, 2007, at 3.
Brad Knickerbocker, Bush’s ‘Caution’ on CO2 Seen as ‘Foot-Dragging’ by Critics, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 3, 2008, at 17 (reporting that EPA staffers concluded that the emissions
were a “major threat to water supplies, crops, wildlife, and other aspects of public welfare”
and that this finding was “forwarded to the White House for review in December”);
Christopher Lee, Scientists Report Political Interference, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2008, at A19
(“[A] congressional committee recently reported that EPA staff members had determined in
December that greenhouse gas emissions endanger public health . . . .”).
See Juliet Eilperin, White House Tried To Silence EPA Proposal on Car Emissions, WASH. POST,
June 26, 2008, at A2; Editorial, More Flimflam on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at
A16.
Felicity Barringer, White House Refused To Open E-mail on Pollutants, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2008, at A15.

11
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White House,32 that the EPA finally issued not a set of proposed rules (as it
initially proposed to do) but rather a diluted Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR) that gave the public an opportunity to comment on the
issue before the EPA issued any proposed rules.33 Thus, political forces at OMB
during the Bush Administration trumped the EPA’s initial attempts to exercise
its expertise to propose rules regulating the emissions. Things then changed
again when President Obama came into office in 2009, and the EPA under
Obama determined that greenhouse gases do pose a danger to the public’s
health and welfare.34 This prominent political zigzagging highlights the tension
between expertise and politics and underscores the need to better understand
what role politics should properly play in administrative decisionmaking.
Finally, a third recent development that highlights the need to gain a better
understanding of the proper place of politics involves charges that regularly
were thrown at the Bush White House accusing the Administration of
distorting scientific facts to serve political goals.35 Regardless of whether or not
the Bush Administration deliberately sought to subvert science, the mere
frequency of such allegations helps to highlight how the current demand for
technical, scientific, or expert-driven explanations from agencies may well
cause agencies to feel pressure to align facts and science with political goals.
In exploring the appropriate place of politics in administrative rulemaking,
this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I is descriptive. It describes how courts,
agencies, and scholars today generally assume that agency decisions made in
the rulemaking context must speak in expert-based terms, not political terms,
in order to meet the reason-giving requirement of arbitrary and capricious
review.
Part II makes the normative case for change. Specifically, Part II sets forth
four major benefits that would flow from altering modern day conceptions of
arbitrary and capricious review in order to give certain political influences an
accepted and transparent place in agency rulemaking. First, although some
major administrative law doctrines reflect a shift from an expert-based model
of agency decisionmaking to a politically-based model, hard look review has

32.
33.
34.
35.

12

Id.
See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354
(proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
See Juliet Eilperin, EPA Says Emissions Are Threat to Public, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2009, at
A1.
See Juliet Eilperin, Putting Some Heat on Bush: Scientist Inspires Anger, Awe for Challenges on
Global Warming, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2005, at A17; Jeremy Symons, Op-Ed., How Bush and
Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B4; see also infra notes 175-179 and
accompanying text (describing charges levied against the Bush Administration accusing it of
distorting science to serve political goals).

WATTS_119_2.DOC

proposing a place for politics

failed to reflect this change. Allowing agencies to disclose political influences
and enabling courts to credit openly political judgments would help to bring
hard look review, which currently hinges on an outmoded model of “expert”
decisionmaking, into harmony with other major doctrines, such as Chevron
deference,36 which seem to embrace the newer political control model. Second,
encouraging agencies to disclose political factors could help to take some of the
pressure off of science, creating a more effective separation between science and
politics. Third, embracing a proper role for politics could give courts yet
another reason to defer to agencies, thereby offering a means of softening the
“ossification” charge frequently raised against arbitrary and capricious review.
Fourth, encouraging agencies to disclose political factors rather than hiding
behind technocratic façades would enable political influences to come out into
the open, thereby enabling greater political accountability.
Part III considers the specific mechanics of how such a change might occur,
analyzing as a doctrinal matter when arbitrary and capricious review could
most appropriately embrace political considerations. In particular, Part III
looks at four questions. First, when can statutes be read as signaling Congress’s
intent to allow or to disallow agency reliance upon political influences? Second,
assuming that a particular congressional statute has not prohibited an agency
from relying upon political influences altogether, what specific types of
political influences should be allowed to justify agency action? Third, who
stands as a potential source of legitimate political influence? Fourth, what
specific types of rulemaking decisions might most appropriately be influenced
by politics?
Finally, Part IV addresses five potential hurdles that could stand in the way
of providing politics with a place. The first obstacle discussed in Part IV can be
called the “first-mover” dilemma: agencies may be reluctant to rely upon
political factors without knowing ahead of time whether courts will accept
them, yet courts may lack incentives to send signals to agencies indicating in
the abstract their willingness to consider political factors if agencies have yet to
rely openly upon such factors. A second potential objection is whether the
“carrot” offered to agencies by this Article’s proposal needs to be balanced by a
“stick” that would punish agencies when they rely upon political influences but
fail to fess up to such reliance. A third potential obstacle involves whether
courts realistically can be expected to embrace politics in the regulatory regime,
or whether courts’ own discomfort with politics will likely lead them to
continue to insist on agency decisions explained in technocratic terms. A fourth
possible objection is whether giving politics a place in rulemaking would
unduly undermine separation of powers principles. Finally, a fifth objection

36.

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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involves the potential difficulty of asking courts to review political influences
that may be ill-suited to legal restraint. Ultimately, Part IV concludes that none
of these hurdles is insurmountable.
i. a focus on expert, not politicized, agency
decisionmaking
When agencies engage in rulemaking today, they face a number of legal
constraints that check their decisionmaking process: agencies’ factual findings
must be supported by the evidence,37 their legal conclusions must be consistent
with relevant constitutional and statutory provisions,38 and the reasons
agencies give to support their decisions must be adequate.39 This last
requirement—a “reason-giving” requirement that demands that agencies
adequately explain their decisions—stems from section 706(2)(A) of the APA,
which instructs courts to set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary” or
“capricious.”40
As this Part describes, courts, agencies, and scholars today generally read
the reason-giving requirement that flows from arbitrary and capricious review
as demanding that agencies justify their decisions in expert-driven or statutory
terms. Courts applying arbitrary and capricious review, accordingly, search for
technocratic decisionmaking.41 Agencies—likely taking a cue from the
judiciary’s preference for expert-based decisionmaking—routinely accompany
their newly promulgated rules with detailed and lengthy discussions of the
relevant statute, the data, the methods of reasoning, and responses to
comments received.42 And scholars too generally seem to embrace agencies’
reason-giving duty as a means of forcing expert-based decisionmaking.43

37.
38.
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
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See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (2006).
See id. § 706(2)(B)-(C).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (instructing reviewing courts to “hold
unlawful . . . agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
See infra Section I.A.
See PIERCE, supra note 2, at 82; see also infra Section I.B. (discussing the judiciary’s demand
for expert-based decisionmaking).
See infra Section I.C.
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A. The Judiciary’s Search for Expert-Based Decisionmaking
The judiciary’s application of arbitrary and capricious review has “changed
dramatically” over time.44 Initially, before the passage of the APA, the Supreme
Court likened agencies to legislatures for purposes of judicial review45 and
indicated that only very minimal judicial review—akin to mere rationality
review—would be applied.46 Hence, courts would not find an agency rule to be
arbitrary so long as “any state of facts reasonably [could] be conceived that
would sustain it.”47 As Professor Richard Pierce has explained, under this
formulation of arbitrariness review, “an agency needed no evidence, no record,
and no statement of reasons to support a rule; rules were rarely challenged;
and challenges were rarely successful.”48
After the APA was enacted in 1946, things did not change much. The APA’s
text did require that agencies include with their notice-and-comment rules a
“concise . . . statement of . . . basis and purpose,”49 thereby providing courts
with a basis for striking down agency rules as arbitrary or capricious under
section 706(2)(A) of the APA. However, even after the APA’s passage, agencies
continued to receive an “extraordinary level of deference.”50
It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that change really began in the world
of arbitrary and capricious review. At this time, serious concerns emerged that
agencies were being “captured” by the private interests that they regulated.51
What had been the prevalent “expertise-based” model of agency
decisionmaking, which viewed agencies as professional, apolitical experts

44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

PIERCE, supra note 2, at 81.
See Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 558 (4th ed. 2007); Merrick B. Garland,
Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 532 (1985).
Pac. States Box & Basket Co., 296 U.S. at 185; see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 224 (1943) (“The Regulations are assailed as ‘arbitrary and capricious.’ If this
contention means that the Regulations are unwise, that they are not likely to succeed in
accomplishing what the Commission intended, we can say only that the appellants have
selected the wrong forum for such a plea.”).
PIERCE, supra note 2, at 81.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
LAWSON, supra note 46, at 558.
Warren, supra note 1, at 2602 (noting that in 1960s and 1970s, “trust in agency experts
evaporated” and “academics and public officials began to believe that many agencies had
been captured by the industries and private interests that they regulated”); see also Thomas
W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997)
(describing capture theory); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 441 & n.17 (2003) (same).
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charged with pursuing the public interest, began to fade away.52 In response,
various prominent judges on the D.C. Circuit crafted a ramped up version of
“arbitrary and capricious” review—called “hard look” review—that enabled
courts to scrutinize agency decisions and to ensure that the public interest was
being served.53 According to this more aggressive, less deferential version of
arbitrary and capricious review, a court has a duty “to intervene . . . if the court
becomes aware . . . that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the
salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”54
Applying this more stringent level of review, courts began to scrutinize the
substantive elements of agency decisions to ensure that agencies gave adequate
consideration to the relevant data and gave reasoned explanations to support
their decisions.55 This meant that courts expected an agency to specify in detail
its “policy preferences, its reasoning, and its factual support” in addition to
demonstrating that it “had responded to significant points made during the
public comment period, had examined all relevant factors, and had considered
significant alternatives to the course of action ultimately chosen.”56
Given that hard look review and its fairly onerous reason-giving
requirements stretched the traditional understanding of the APA, some
observers thought that the Supreme Court—when presented with the right
opportunity—would reject hard look review.57 In fact, however, in 1983 in State
52.
53.

54.
55.

56.
57.

16

Warren, supra note 1, at 2602.
See PIERCE, supra note 2, at 82 (describing how “[t]his new approach to judicial application
of the arbitrary and capricious test to rules adopted through use of informal rulemaking was
referred to as the ‘hard look’ doctrine”); see also Garland, supra note 46, at 525 (discussing
the birth and the development of hard look doctrine); Warren, supra note 1, at 2602-03
(describing development of hard look review).
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.).
See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)) (“Though a reviewing
court will not match submission against counter-submission to decide whether the agency
was correct in its conclusion on scientific matters (unless that conclusion is arbitrary), it will
consider whether the agency has taken account of all ‘relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment.’”); Nat’l Ass’n of Food Chains v. ICC, 535 F.2d 1308, 1314
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C.
Cir. 1970)) (“This court repeatedly has emphasized, however, that an agency must
demonstrate that it has ‘really taken a “hard look” at the salient problems, and has . . .
genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.’”); Indus. Union Dep’t v. Hodgson, 499
F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“What we are entitled to at all events is a careful
identification by the Secretary, when his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons
why he chooses to follow one course rather than another.”).
Garland, supra note 46, at 526-27.
See PIERCE, supra note 2, at 83.
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Farm, the Court issued an opinion that embraced the D.C. Circuit’s “hard
look” take on arbitrary and capricious review.58
In State Farm, the Court reviewed a decision made by the new Reagan
Administration’s NHTSA to rescind a rule previously promulgated under the
Carter Administration that required certain cars to be equipped with either air
bags or automatic seat belts.59 In the Court’s opinion written by Justice White,
the Court rejected the government’s argument that arbitrary and capricious
review “requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute must bear in
order to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause.”60 Instead, the
Court explained that although review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard is “narrow,” an agency’s reason-giving duty under arbitrary and
capricious review requires the agency to take a close look at the evidence, data,
and facts before the agency:
[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a “rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.” In reviewing that
explanation, we must “consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment.” Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.61
Applying this standard, the Court ultimately concluded that the NHTSA
had failed to adequately meet its duty of reasoned decisionmaking. Specifically,
the Court held that the NHTSA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
rescinding the passive restraint requirement because—although the agency
claimed that automatic detachable seat belts would not attain anticipated safety
benefits—the agency had failed to consider the possibility of an airbags-only
requirement.62 The majority also concluded that the agency had failed to

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 43 n.9.
Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 46-48 (noting that the ineffectiveness of one safety mechanism “does not cast doubt
on the need for a passive restraint standard or upon the efficacy of airbag technology”); see
also id. at 46 (“There was no suggestion in the long rulemaking process . . . that if only one
of these options were feasible, no passive restraint standard should be promulgated.”).
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adequately justify its decision to dismiss the safety benefits of automatic
detachable seat belts.63
Then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by three others, wrote a separate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the majority that the
agency had failed to explain why it rescinded the airbag requirement and
concurred in that portion of the majority’s opinion. However, he disagreed
with the majority’s conclusion that the NHTSA’s “view of detachable
automatic seat belts was arbitrary and capricious.”64 He accepted the agency’s
conclusion (based primarily on logic and on the agency’s dismissal of the
relevance of a study) that any safety benefits would be small because of the
likelihood that users would detach the belts and not reattach them.65
At the end of his opinion, Rehnquist proceeded to provide a possible
explanation of what was really going on in the case—an explanation related to
politics.66 Specifically, Rehnquist wrote:
The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to the
election of a new President of a different political party. It is readily
apparent that the responsible members of one administration may
consider public resistance and uncertainties to be more important than
do their counterparts in a previous administration. A change in
administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the
costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the
agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is
entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light
of the philosophy of the administration.67
Rehnquist’s acceptance of the agency’s rescission of the detachable belt
portion of the standard did not ultimately hinge on this political explanation.
Nor did Rehnquist’s opinion suggest that politics alone could be treated as a

63.
64.
65.
66.

67.

18

Id. at 53-55.
Id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 59. The lower court in State Farm also noted the political context of the NHTSA’s
decision. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Dep’t of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 213 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (noting that the NHTSA’s proposal of the possible rescission was “announced by the
White House Press Office on April 6, 1981, as part of a larger package of economic recovery
measures”); see also id. at 240 n.44 (noting that “notice of rulemaking to rescind [the]
standard was based at least in part on economic problems of the automobile industry, and
was announced by [the] White House in Actions to Help the U.S. Auto Industry”).
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sufficient justification for the agency’s decision. Yet Rehnquist clearly did
embrace the notion that political influences might reasonably act as a legitimate
pressure on an agency’s policymaking process, so long as the agency remains
within the boundaries set by Congress in the relevant statutory scheme.
The Court did not respond to Rehnquist’s points about the political
context of the decision. In fact, the Court’s decision skipped over the political
context altogether, focusing on the agency’s technocratic justifications for the
rule rescission instead.68 Most likely this was because the NHTSA itself did not
openly acknowledge that political factors had influenced its decision. Thus, the
Court’s focus on the evidence and facts before the agency (and its silence on the
issue of politics) likely was not meant to signal the Court’s affirmative rejection
of Rehnquist’s embrace of politics. Instead, the Court’s silence on the issue
most likely was simply a reflection of the fact that the agency and the litigants
had not teed up the issue.69 Nonetheless, the opinion has been widely read
over time to represent the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of politics.70
Ever since State Farm, courts engaging in arbitrary and capricious review
routinely have demanded more than mere minimum rationality, and they have
searched agency decisions to ensure they represent expert-driven, technocratic
decisionmaking.71
Decisions from the D.C. Circuit, which is by far the most important court
in the country when it comes to federal administrative law,72 help to illustrate
how prevalent State Farm’s focus on evidence, facts, and expertise has become.
Opinions from the D.C. Circuit do not expressly reject political considerations
but they repeatedly borrow from State Farm’s language, framing arbitrary and
capricious review in expert-driven terms and asking whether the agency
“offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before

68.

69.

70.
71.

72.

See id. at 46-57 (majority opinion); see also Herz, supra note 8, at 310 (“Justice White did not
contradict Justice Rehnquist’s description of the political setting or conclude that it was
outweighed by other factors. Rather, he ignored it altogether, implicitly deeming the politics
of the rescission simply irrelevant.”).
Compare EDLEY, supra note 4, at 63-66 (arguing that State Farm misidentified the decisionmaking “paradigm as science rather than politics”), with Stephen F. Williams, The Roots of
Deference, 100 YALE L.J. 1103, 1107-08 (1991) (reviewing EDLEY, supra note 4) (arguing that
the Court in State Farm did not identify science instead of politics as the decision-making
paradigm but rather that the agency and the litigants did).
See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 183; MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 4, at 226; Herz, supra note 8,
at 310-11; Kagan, supra note 4, at 2380-81; Stack, supra note 4, at 307 n.191.
See Kagan, supra note 4, at 2270 (noting that courts require “that agency action bear the
indicia of essentially apolitical, ‘expert’ process and judgment”); see also supra note 4 and
accompanying text (discussing courts’ demand for expert-based decisionmaking).
See LAWSON, supra note 46, at 244.
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the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.”73 Other courts are no different. They
too, although generally not expressly ruling out political considerations, have
ruled out politics by inference, routinely asking whether the agency’s decision
is adequately explained in light of the statute, the evidence and facts before the
agency, or the agency’s expertise.74
Only one recent arbitrary and capricious case from the circuit courts—a
concurring opinion issued in UAW v. Chao75—represents a significant
departure from the judiciary’s singular focus on law, facts, and expertise.76 In
Chao, the Third Circuit reviewed OSHA’s 2003 denial of a rulemaking petition
filed in 1993 asking it to promulgate a rule that would have established a
standard for occupational exposure to metalworking fluids. Although OSHA’s
ultimate decision (made during the Bush Administration) to deny the petition
seemed inconsistent with the agency’s prior 1995 decision (made during the
Clinton Administration) to designate metalworking fluids as a high agency
priority, the Third Circuit upheld the denial of the petition. The court stressed
that OSHA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious because OSHA
“weighed the scientific evidence of health hazards . . . against its other
regulatory priorities” and “identified the reasons why regulating . . . [would]
require an ‘enormous’ allocation of resources.”77
In a concurring opinion, Judge Pollak agreed with the majority but
explained that he would acknowledge what was really at stake in the case:

73.

74.

75.
76.

77.
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Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy v. DEA, 509 F.3d 541, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(“[W]e must satisfy ourselves that the agency examine[d] the relevant data and
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.”) (internal citations omitted).
See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1193
(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983)); CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)), judgment vacated by FCC
v. CBS Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009).
361 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2004).
Portions of a dissenting opinion written by Judge Kozinski in 2006 also suggest that Judge
Kozinski might be inclined, at least in the inaction context, to allow agencies to decide not to
adopt regulations for political reasons, such as a change in administrations. See Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 850 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). However, rather than suggesting that
such political factors be embraced by arbitrary and capricious review, Judge Kozinski
suggests that the presence of political, nonlegal justifications for agency inaction are a reason
to apply a rule of nonreviewability to agency inaction. See id. at 850.
Chao, 361 F.3d at 255.
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“[W]hat is at issue in this case is a change in regulatory policy coincident with
a change in administration.”78 Citing Rehnquist’s opinion in State Farm, Judge
Pollak noted that “[t]here is nothing obscure, and nothing suspect, about” a
change in regulatory priorities that coincides with a change in administration.79
Rather, he said that this is “one of the important things that elections are
about.”80
Consistent with State Farm and with the judiciary’s overall willingness to
turn a blind eye to the role political influences actually do play in agency
decisionmaking processes, the majority in Chao said nothing about Judge
Pollak’s reliance on the political context of the agency’s decision. Thus, in
contrast to Judge Pollak’s views, the majority opinion in Chao simply serves to
underscore the judiciary’s widespread practice of demanding that agency
decisions be explained in expert-driven or legal terms, not political terms.
One of the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements of note involving
arbitrary and capricious review, Massachusetts v. EPA,81 should only help to
solidify the judiciary’s overall willingness to demand technocratic
decisionmaking. In Massachusetts, the Court reviewed the EPA’s denial of a
rulemaking petition that asked the EPA to regulate certain emissions from new
motor vehicles that lead to global warming.82 Justice Stevens’s opinion for a
five-Justice majority held that the EPA has the statutory authority to regulate
such emissions and that the various policy-driven reasons the EPA offered for
declining to regulate, ranging from a desire to avoid piecemeal regulation to a
desire to avoid interfering with the President’s foreign policy initiatives, were
not sufficient reasons for denying the rulemaking petition.83 Thus, the Court
ultimately sent the EPA back to the drawing board, embracing an expertisedriven notion of agency decisionmaking akin to what the Court previously
embraced in State Farm.84 Essentially, the Court told the EPA that it wanted to
see the “expert” agency do the work and make a scientific determination of
whether the emissions do or do not endanger the public health or welfare

78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.

Id. at 256 (Pollak, J., concurring).
Id. at 256 & n.1.
Id.
549 U.S. 497 (2007). In Massachusetts, the Court did not apply the APA but rather applied a
specific provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA) that closely tracks section 706(2)(A) of the
APA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2000) (calling for reversal of action “found to be . . .
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 513.
Id. at 533.
See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 54 (arguing that Massachusetts could be
considered “State Farm for a new generation”) (citation omitted).
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within the meaning of the statute. Policy-driven considerations were to factor
into the agency decision to regulate or not to regulate, if at all, only after the
expert agency did the technical work and made an expert judgment.85
As Professors Vermeule and Freeman have argued, the Court’s focus in
Massachusetts on agency expertise embraces a type of “expertise-forcing”
whereby the Court sought to “protect administrative expertise from political
intrusion” by forcing agencies to engage in expert-driven decisionmaking.86 In
this sense, Massachusetts loudly reiterates the message that State Farm has been
read to have established more than twenty years earlier: agencies must justify
their decisions in expert-driven, not political, terms if they wish to convince
courts that reasoned decisionmaking has occurred.
Just this past Term, however, the Court issued a notable decision involving
arbitrary and capricious review, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,87 that does
not seem to neatly fit within Massachusetts’s and State Farm’s technocratic
lenses. In Fox, the Court reviewed orders issued by the FCC upholding
indecency findings for the isolated utterances of the F- and S-words during
television broadcasts. The FCC’s decision that fleeting expletives can be
actionable marked a change in the FCC’s policy—a change that Justice Scalia
frankly acknowledged was “spurred by significant political pressure from
Congress.”88 In upholding the FCC’s orders, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Court emphatically rejected the notion that all shifts in agency policy are
subject to more rigorous judicial review,89 and hence his opinion seems to
make it easier for agencies to change their policies due to changes in the
political landscape.90 In this sense, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court at least
implicitly seems to cast doubt on a technocratic approach.91 In contrast, in his
dissenting opinion in Fox, Justice Breyer joined by Justices Stevens and

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on
Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1043 (2008).
Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 54, 64-65.
129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
Id. at 1816. Justice Scalia was joined in this Part of the opinion only by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Thomas and Alito—not by Justice Kennedy.
Id. at 1810 (“We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a
requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review.”).
Id.
Id. at 1810-11. This part of Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito. Another portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion, which was
not joined by Justice Kennedy, implies even more strongly that political explanations may
be enough to justify agency action: “If the FCC is indeed an agent of Congress, it would
seem an adequate explanation of its change of position that Congress made clear its wishes
for stricter enforcement.” Id. at 1816 (internal citations omitted).
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Ginsburg and then-Justice Souter expressed discomfort with allowing political
influences to factor into agency decisionmaking, arguing that existing law does
not permit the FCC to “make policy choices for purely political reasons.”92 The
Court’s divided opinion in Fox, accordingly, might suggest that some cracks
are forming in the foundation holding up the technocratic model despite the
judiciary’s longstanding pattern of demanding technocratic decisionmaking.
B. Agencies’ Focus on Technocratic Factors
Given that courts generally apply arbitrary and capricious review in a way
that calls on agencies to justify their decisions in technocratic terms, it should
come as no surprise that agencies today generally couch their decisions in
technocratic, statutory, or scientific language, either failing to disclose or
affirmatively hiding political influences that factor into the mix. Numerous
examples of this can be found in recent rulemaking proceedings.93
Take, for example, the FDA’s controversial attempt in the 1990s to regulate
teen smoking. President Clinton played a very active role in directing the
rulemaking. He personally announced the initiation of the rulemaking at a
press conference, publicly stating: “[T]oday I am authorizing the Food and
Drug Administration to initiate a broad series of steps all designed to stop sales
and marketing of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to children.”94 He also
subsequently announced the final rule in a Rose Garden ceremony where he
noted that the rule being announced was “the right thing to do, scientifically,
legally, and morally.”95 Yet the detailed and lengthy statement of basis and
purpose supporting the FDA’s final rule relied upon statutory, scientific, and
expert justifications—barely even hinting at President Clinton’s significant

92.
93.
94.

95.

Id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See generally Strauss, supra note 10, at 966-67 (describing agencies’ failure to disclose
political influences in certain rulemaking proceedings).
See The President’s News Conference, II PUB. PAPERS 1237 (Aug. 10, 1995) (announcing that
“by executive authority, I will restrict sharply the advertising, promotion, distribution, and
marketing of cigarettes to teenagers”).
See Remarks Announcing the Final Rule To Protect Youth from Tobacco, II PUB. PAPERS
1332, 1333 (Aug. 23, 1996) (“A year ago this month, we launched a comprehensive strategy to
kick tobacco out of the lives of our children. We proposed strong restrictions on advertising,
marketing, and sales of cigarettes to children. In the year that followed, the FDA received a
torrent of comments from the public, more than 700,000, by far the largest outpouring of
public response in the FDA’s history. The FDA has heard from doctors, scientists, tobacco
companies, and tens of thousands of children. We have carefully considered the evidence.”).
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involvement in the rulemaking.96 Thus, as Professor Peter Strauss has noted,
“[a] person who had not been reading newspapers or listening to presidential
speeches” would have seen “only an ordinary (if high-visibility) agency rule,
adopted and defended in the ordinary manner” and would not have seen
evidence of the President’s active and open political involvement.97 Likewise, a
court limiting its review to the rulemaking record would have seen only “a
quite ordinary collection of documents and voluminous explanations of expert
judgment.”98
Another example of an agency’s failure to disclose political influences in the
course of a rulemaking can be found in the EPA’s lowering of the reporting
thresholds for certain persistent, bioaccumulative, toxic (PBT) chemicals.99 In
connection with Earth Day in April 1998, Vice President Gore directed the EPA
to list and lower the reporting thresholds for PBT chemicals reported under
section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.100
In accordance with Vice President Gore’s directions, the EPA went ahead and
promulgated a rule in 1999 that, among other things, lowered the reporting
thresholds for certain PBTs.101 Yet the EPA’s statement of basis and purpose

96.

97.

98.
99.
100.

101.
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See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996). One brief and
fleeting reference to the President’s involvement can be found in the FDA’s response to a
comment raising concern that the FDA’s real goal was to achieve an outright ban on
tobacco. See id. at 44,419 (noting that “when the President announced the proposed FDA
regulations on August 10, 1995, one reporter asked whether an outright ban would be more
logical than a ‘regulatory partial step’” and the President replied by stating that he thought
“it would be wrong to ban cigarettes outright”).
Strauss, supra note 10, at 967; see also Kagan, supra note 4, at 2283 (“The final documents,
containing new proscriptions on tobacco manufacturers and vendors, a statement of the
health-related justifications for those proscriptions, and a lengthy defense of FDA
jurisdiction over the issue, nowhere mentioned the President; rules, as a historic matter,
very rarely have done so, and this one was no exception.”).
Strauss, supra note 10, at 967 (emphasis added).
Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,666 (Oct. 29, 1999).
See EPA Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 65 Fed. Reg. 73,453, 73,460
(Nov. 30, 2000) (noting that the initiative was “announced by the Vice President on EPA’s
Earth Day 1998 in response to the finding that most commercial chemicals have very little, if
any, publicly available toxicity information on which to make sound judgments about
potential risks”); id. at 73,458 (“The Chemical Right-to-Know Initiative, which was
announced by the Vice President in April 1998, included a directive to the Agency to list and
lower the reporting thresholds for persistent, bioaccumulative, toxic (PBT) chemicals reported
under section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.”)
(emphasis added).
See Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,666; see also EPA
Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 65 Fed. Reg. at 73,458 (“In accord with
the Vice President’s directive, EPA has set out the criteria that will be used for determining if
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accompanying the final rule says nothing about influences from the executive
branch generally or the Vice President more specifically.102 Rather, the EPA’s
document announcing the final rule speaks entirely in statutory and scientific
terms.
The EPA’s silence about Vice President Gore’s involvement is particularly
interesting when the EPA’s 1999 rule is contrasted with the agency’s
November 2000 regulatory plan published in the Unified Agenda. In the
November 2000 Unified Agenda, in the course of disclosing another proposed
rule involving PBTs that was on the agency’s agenda at the time, the EPA
noted that it previously promulgated the 1999 rule lowering the reporting
thresholds “[i]n accord with the Vice President’s directive.”103 One could
speculate that the EPA included this reference to political influence in its
November 2000 description of its regulatory plan—but not in the actual
statement of basis and purpose accompanying the 1999 rule—because the point
of the regulatory plan is to speak directly to the executive branch: the plan seeks
to demonstrate to the executive branch that the agency’s rulemaking priorities
and agenda are consistent with presidential priorities.104 In contrast, a notice of
a final rule could be thought of as speaking to interested parties and to the courts
in that it aims to justify the validity of that particular rule in terms sufficient to
stave off or to withstand judicial challenge and perhaps also to win a broader
public relations battle.
The two examples just given—the high-profile tobacco rulemaking and the
lower-profile rulemaking involving PBT chemicals—both involved the Clinton
Administration. Examples of agencies’ failures to disclose political factors
influencing their rulemaking proceedings, however, are not limited to the
Clinton Administration. Rather, the same pattern persisted during the recent
Bush presidency as well. One representative example from the Bush presidency
involves a rulemaking conducted by the Department of Health & Human
Services (HHS). Shortly after President Bush entered the White House, he

102.
103.
104.

a chemical is persistent and bioaccumulative under EPCRA section 313 and has lowered the
EPCRA section 313 reporting thresholds.”).
See Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,666.
EPA Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 65 Fed. Reg. at 73,458.
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(b), (c), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993) (requiring
federal agencies to prepare a “unified regulatory agenda” and “regulatory plan” for
submission to OIRA); see also id. § 4(c)(5), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,739 (“If the Administrator of
OIRA believes that a planned regulatory action of an agency may be inconsistent with the
President’s priorities or the principles set forth in this Executive order or may be in conflict
with any policy or action taken or planned by another agency, the Administrator of OIRA
shall promptly notify, in writing, the affected agencies, the Advisors, and the Vice
President.”).
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publicly issued a written statement concerning federal regulations involving
the privacy of medical records.105 In his public statement, President Bush noted
that he had directed the Secretary of HHS to allow the medical privacy rules
that had been crafted during the Clinton Administration to become effective,
but he also noted that—in light of “legitimate concerns” about the rule—he had
asked the Secretary “to recommend appropriate modifications to the rule.”106
In the wake of this public directive from the President, the Secretary directed
HHS to propose appropriate changes to the privacy rules, which HHS
ultimately did on March 27, 2002.107 The proposed changes to the rules were
published in August 2002 and went into effect October 15, 2002.108 Notably,
however, the final rulemaking document includes only statutory and
technocratic justifications for the rule changes; it does not even so much as
mention President Bush’s public statement directing modification of the
rules.109 Thus, HHS’s rulemaking follows the clear pattern that can be seen in
agency rulemakings as a whole: a focus on traditional statutory, scientific, or
technocratic terms and a failure to transparently disclose political influences.
There are, however, a few recent agency decisions that seem to buck this
general trend, serving as “exceptions” to the general rule. One very recent
exception involves fuel economy standards for model year 2011 passenger cars
and light trucks issued by the Department of Transportation (DOT) under the
Obama Administration.110 During the Bush Administration, the NHTSA under
the DOT issued proposed rules to address fuel efficiency standards for model
years 2011 through 2015. However, on January 7, 2009, right at the end of
Bush’s presidency, the DOT issued a statement explaining that the fuel
efficiency standards would not be finalized under the Bush Administration
because “[t]he recent financial difficulties of the automobile industry will
require the next administration to conduct a thorough review of matters
affecting the industry, including how to effectively implement the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).”111 Just days after being sworn

105.
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Statement on Federal Regulations on Privacy of Medical Records, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 611 (Apr. 12, 2001).
Id. at 612.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182,
53,183 (Aug. 14, 2002).
Id. at 53,182.
Id.
See Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74
Fed. Reg. 14,196 (Mar. 30, 2009).
Id. at 14,199 (quoting Statement from the U.S. Department of Transportation, available at
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot0109.htm).
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into office in January 2009, President Obama—following through on a
campaign promise to promote energy efficiency—brought the issue back to life
by issuing a memorandum directing the DOT to quickly finalize standards for
model year 2011 and to establish standards for subsequent model years via a
separate rulemaking.112 The President publicly announced this directive at the
White House while flanked by the head of the DOT, as well as other key
members of his energy and environment teams.113
The NHTSA quickly followed President Obama’s directions, issuing final
standards for model year 2011 in March 2009 and postponing decision on
subsequent model years. Most significant for purposes of this Article is the fact
that the NHTSA’s final rule adopting the 2011 standards repeatedly references
the President’s directions and preferences, thereby giving the clear impression
that the President had exerted significant influence over the agency’s decision.
For example, the NHTSA noted in the summary of its action that “the
President issued a memorandum on January 26, 2009” in the “context of his
calls for the development of new national policies to prompt sustained
domestic and international actions to address the closely intertwined issues of
energy independence, energy security and climate change.”114 The NHTSA also
explained that it was deferring action on standards for the later model years so
as to ensure that it will select standards that contribute “to the maximum
extent possible within [statutory limits], to meeting the energy and
environmental challenges and goals outlined by the President.”115
Another exception to agencies’ general failure to disclose political influences
involves the withdrawal of a rule initially proposed in 1989 by the Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA). The proposed rule would have, among
other things, established “permissible exposure limits” for substances that
might adversely affect the health of miners.116 In September 2002, the MSHA
decided to withdraw portions of the proposed rule from its agenda,117
explaining in a cursory fashion that its decision to withdraw the proposed rule

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See id.; see also John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama’s Order Likely To Tighten Auto
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at A1.
See Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Obama Issues Orders Toward More Fuel-Efficient Cars,
WASH. POST., Jan. 27, 2009, at A4.
Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74
Fed. Reg. 14,196.
Id.
Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 54 Fed. Reg.
35,760 (proposed Aug. 29, 1989).
Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 67 Fed. Reg.
60,611 (Sept. 26, 2002).
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“was the result of changes in agency priorities” and the possible adverse effect
of an appellate court decision. The MSHA also explained that it had been
“more than 13 years since the proposal was published and more than 12 years
since the comments were received” and that the record was stale.118
The MSHA’s rulemaking withdrawal ultimately faced a judicial challenge,
and the D.C. Circuit concluded that the agency had failed to provide a
sufficient explanation justifying the withdrawal.119 On remand, the MSHA
published a detailed explanation of its rule withdrawal, elaborating on why its
statutory responsibilities, the change in agency priorities, and the staleness of
the rulemaking record all called for withdrawal. On the issue of changing
agency priorities, the MSHA stressed that the Secretary of Labor had revisited
and reprioritized the agency’s agenda consistent with a “federal agency-wide
initiative intended to maintain sound regulatory practice,” which was
announced by President Bush’s Chief of Staff Andrew Card in a written
memorandum to agency heads.120 Notably, in justifying why this politically
driven reprioritization should count as an “adequate” explanation for its
decision, the MSHA drew directly from the views Judge Pollak set forth in
Chao just one year earlier: “‘[T]here is nothing obscure, and nothing suspect
about regulatory policy changes coincident with changes in administration,’”
the MSHA explained, quoting from Judge Pollak.121 “[E]ach administration
embraces its own priority-setting process and regulatory philosophy such that
items considered priority by one administration may not be so by another
administration.”122
Although the MSHA’s explanation of the rule withdrawal provides a very
good example of how agencies are in fact influenced by political factors and
how they could disclose such influences, the MSHA’s acknowledgement of
politics in its rulemaking—just like the NHTSA’s references to Obama’s

118.
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Id.
See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (concluding, among other things, that the “MSHA’s statement that there was a
‘change in agency priorities,’ without explanation, is not informative in the least”).
See Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg.
67,681, 67,686 (Nov. 19, 2004) (citing Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant
to the President and Chief of Staff, to Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001)).
Id. (citing UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (Pollak, J., concurring)).
Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. at
67,686.

WATTS_119_2.DOC

proposing a place for politics

influence in its 2009 fuel efficiency rulemaking—stand as exceptions, not the
norm. Generally agencies sweep political influences under the rug.123
C. Scholars’ Acceptance of the Push for Expertise
Like courts and agencies, scholars too have spent insufficient time
considering whether politics and arbitrary and capricious review could work
together. This is not due to a lack of scholarly interest in hard look review in
general. To the contrary, scholars have spent inordinate amounts of time
debating hard look review and criticizing it on a variety of grounds. For
example, many scholars have attacked hard look review on the ground that it
has “ossified” the rulemaking process by making informal rulemaking
burdensome and expensive and by pushing agencies to use other tools to set
regulatory policies.124 In addition, some scholars have argued that intrusive
arbitrary and capricious review is inconsistent with the minimal procedural
requirements imposed by the APA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the
seminal case of Vermont Yankee.125 Notably absent from this scholarship,

123.

124.

125.

A draft of a work by Professor Nina Mendelson corroborates this conclusion, documenting
in detail how “public information about executive supervision” of agency decisions is
“surprisingly rare” despite the frequency with which presidents direct “agencies to take
action of one sort or another, including the promulgation of rules.” Nina A. Mendelson,
Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decisionmaking, 108 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 24, on file with The Yale Law Journal), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1470850.
See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 395 (2000) (summarizing ossification arguments made
by opponents of hard look review); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in
Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1264 (1989) (“There
is mounting evidence that fear of judicial rejection of a policy based on the requirement of
reasoned decisionmaking has introduced into the policymaking process delay and resource
commitments so great that some agencies have abandoned their efforts at policymaking
completely.”); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483 (1997)
(“Articles lamenting the recent ‘ossification’ of notice and comment rulemaking seem to be
the fashion in administrative law scholarship today.”).
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978), the Supreme Court admonished courts for piling additional procedures on top of the
minimal procedures for notice-and-comment rulemaking set out in the APA. For examples
of scholarly works arguing that the judiciary’s formulation of hard look could be read to
violate Vermont Yankee’s command, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee
III, IV, and V? A Response to Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 904-10
(2007); and Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont
Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418 (1981). For a contrary view, see Jack M. Beermann & Gary
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however, has been much critical analysis of how hard look review currently
embraces expertise to the exclusion of politics and incentivizes agencies to
speak only in technocratic terms. Indeed, many scholars seem to accept the
desirability of our current system’s focus on expertise and science.
Take, for example, Professors Vermeule and Freeman’s recent article,
which describes how the Court’s decision in Massachusetts embraces a notion of
“expertise-forcing” that attempts to ensure that agencies exercise expert
judgment free from political pressures.126 In describing the Court’s embrace of
“expertise-forcing,” Professors Vermeule and Freeman speak in a decidedly
positive light about the judiciary’s attempt to insulate administrative expertise
from political influence.127
Other scholars have spoken affirmatively about the virtues of expertise and
insulation and the negative aspects of politics as well. Justice Stephen Breyer,
who has co-authored a prominent administrative law casebook,128 is one of
these scholars. Justice Breyer, for example, has argued that “[a] depoliticized
regulatory process might produce better results, hence increased confidence,
leading to more favorable public and Congressional reactions” and that elite,
professional administrators should play a larger role in regulatory
policymaking.129 Specifically, Justice Breyer has stressed what he sees as the
“inherent” virtues of rationalization, expertise, and insulation, which he
believes should be distanced from politics and public opinion.130
Given that expertise tends to be associated with positive attributes and
politics with negative attributes,131 very little serious, sustained scholarly
attention has been given to exploring how arbitrary and capricious review
might be tweaked to embrace a role for politics in the agency rulemaking
process. Two notable exceptions, however, deserve consideration: a book
published in 1990 by then-Professor and now Dean Christopher Edley; and a

126.
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129.
130.
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Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 880-82 (2007) (arguing
that hard look review is not necessarily inconsistent with Vermont Yankee).
Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 54, 64-67.
Id. at 54, 64-65.
See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY, at xxxvii
(6th ed. 2006).
See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
55-56, 59-60 (1993).
See id. at 60-63 (“[T]he group must have a degree of political insulation to withstand various
political pressures, particularly in respect to individual substances, that emanate from the
public directly or through Congress and other political sources.”).
See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 20-21 (describing the negative attributes often associated with
politics as including willfulness, subjectivity, tyranny by the majority, and nonscientific
norms).
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law review article published by Elena Kagan, former dean of Harvard’s law
school and currently Solicitor General of the United States.132 Both works
address, to varying degrees of detail, the value of political judgment in
administrative decisionmaking and how judicial doctrine might be altered to
embrace political influences.
Edley’s book devotes one chapter to discussing how arbitrary and
capricious review might be read to embrace a role for politics in agency
decisionmaking. Specifically, Edley argues that agencies should “frankly
acknowledge the role of political, ideological, or subjective analyses in their
reasons and findings rather than attempting to obscure those elements behind
the filigree so readily generated by the scientific and adjudicatory fairness
methods of decisionmaking and explanation.”133 He also argues that courts
applying arbitrary and capricious review should police the mix and quality of
an agency’s reliance on political factors, giving “credit [to] politics as an
acceptable and even desirable element of decision making” in appropriate
circumstances.134
Kagan’s 2001 article, much like Edley’s book, represents a major scholarly
attempt to argue for the value of political judgment in administrative
decisionmaking generally. In the article, Kagan focuses on chronicling the
arrival of what she calls an “era of presidential administration,” which Kagan
believes has made the regulatory activity of executive agencies “more and more

132.
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See id.; Kagan, supra note 4. In addition, three other works that discuss the general subject
of politics in agency decisionmaking are well worth mentioning. The first is a recent piece
that makes the argument that “swerves” or “changes” in agency policies due to changes in
administration are not necessarily arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of the APA. See
Joshua McKarcher, Restoring Reason: Reformulating the Swerve Doctrine of Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers v. State Farm, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1342 (2008). The second is a book
published in 1988 by Professor Martin Shapiro, which criticizes courts for treating
rulemaking agencies like courts rather than like “subordinate legislatures” and for effectively
driving “the very prudential decisions that ought to be out front and subject to public and
judicial scrutiny under a technological smoke screen.” SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 156, 171.
The third is a forthcoming article by Professor Nina Mendelson. See Mendelson, supra note
123. Professor Mendelson’s work presents detailed evidence of agency silence regarding
presidential influence on agency rulemaking and argues for greater disclosure by agencies of
such presidential influence. Id. Its primary focus is on the need for agency disclosure of
political influences rather than on judicial review or the arbitrary and capricious doctrine
more specifically. In particular, Professor Mendelson argues that instead of focusing
primarily on judicial review (as this Article does), we should call for a more transparent role
for political influences by imposing procedural requirements on agencies that require them
to disclose executive supervision. See id. at 3, 39-42.
EDLEY, supra note 4, at 190.
Id. at 192.
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an extension of the President’s own policy and political agenda.”135 At the end
of her lengthy article, Kagan considers in a short section what the arrival of
presidential administration might mean for various judicial review doctrines,
including hard look review. In that Section, she suggests that the rise in the
presidential control model of agency decisionmaking should lead courts to alter
hard look review so that courts look not only for technical, expert-driven
explanations but also for publicly disclosed political factors that demonstrate
presidential leadership and accountability.136
Both Edley’s and Kagan’s works provide some much-needed attention to
the virtues of political judgment in regulatory decisionmaking. However,
neither is sufficient. Kagan’s work speaks only very briefly about how agencies
and courts might alter their thinking to enable arbitrary and capricious review
to embrace political influences, and Edley’s book, which was published in
1990, was unable to fully capitalize on more recent developments in
administrative law, such as the Chevron deference doctrine,137 that point away
from an expertise-based notion of agency decisionmaking and toward a
political accountability model.
Thus, in the end, we are left with the following picture: courts have read
arbitrary and capricious review in a way that enables them to search
rulemaking records for expert-based decisionmaking. Agencies—likely
following courts’ cues—justify their rulemaking decisions in technocratic
terms, failing to disclose or affirmatively hiding political influences. And
scholars generally have uncritically accepted the current system’s focus on
technocratic decisionmaking.
ii. the benefits of giving politics a place
Despite how well entrenched the expertise-based view of hard look review
has become in judicial doctrine, agency practice, and academic scholarship,
there are real reasons to change this picture. Specifically, this Article proposes
that arbitrary and capricious review be modified so that certain political
influences would be viewed as an appropriate factor in rulemaking. Altering
hard look review in this way—so that it openly embraces a transparent role for
politics in agency decisionmaking—could yield four major benefits. First,

135.
136.
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Kagan, supra note 4, at 2246, 2248.
Id. at 2380-83.
The “Chevron” deference doctrine is named after Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in which the Court set up its now famous twostep doctrine governing deference to reasonable agency constructions of ambiguous
statutory provisions.
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allowing agencies to unapologetically disclose political influences and enabling
courts to credit openly political judgments would help to bring hard look
review, which currently hinges on an outmoded model of “expert”
decisionmaking, into harmony with other major administrative law doctrines
that embrace the more current “political control” model. Second, giving
politics its own sphere could help to take some of the political pressure off of
science. Third, facilitating a role for politics would give courts yet another
reason to defer to agencies, thereby offering a means of softening the
“ossification” charge frequently leveled against arbitrary and capricious review.
Fourth, encouraging agencies to disclose political factors—rather than hiding
behind technocratic façades—would enable political influences to come out
into the open, thereby enabling greater political accountability, monitoring,
and transparency. This Part will discuss in turn each of these reasons for
altering current conceptions of hard look review.
A. Bringing Greater Coherence to Administrative Law’s Vacillation Between
Expertise and Politics
One major reason why hard look review should be rethought is that it
currently embraces aspects of an outmoded model of agency decisionmaking:
the “expertise model.” During the Progressive Era through the New Deal
period, agencies derived their legitimacy from the notion that they were made
up of professional and capable government “experts” pursuing the “public
interest.”138 Joseph Eastman, who served as a member of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, summed up this view of agencies as apolitical experts
in 1928 when he wrote that independent regulatory commissions are “clearly
nonpartisan in their makeup, and party policies do not enter into their
activities except to the extent that such policies may be definitely registered in
the statutes which they are sworn to enforce.”139 Similarly, James M. Landis, a

138.

139.

See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.7, at 25 (4th ed. 2002) (“The
explosive growth of administrative agencies during the New Deal took place in an
environment of reverence for technocratic solutions and judicial distrust of political
institutions.”); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 60-62 (“The Progressive creed was experts
in the service of the public and government as essentially a set of technical services provided
to the citizenry.”); Paul R. Verkuil, Understanding the “Public Interest” Justification for
Government Actions, 39 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 141, 141 (1998) (“The words ‘public
interest’ are probably invoked more than any other to explain and justify government action,
whether in delegations of legislative authority to agencies or in explanations by agency
officials to the public.”).
Joseph B. Eastman, The Place of the Independent Commission, 12 CONST. REV. 95, 101 (1928).
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major champion of the modern administrative state,140 articulated a similar
view in 1938 when he wrote that administrators are bureaucratic “men of
professional attainment” and “men bred to the facts” who “envisage
governance as a career.”141
By the time hard look review emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, this
“expertise-based” model of agency decisionmaking had fallen out of favor.142 In
place of the expertise-based model had come a new theory of agency
behavior—the “capture” theory—which saw agencies not as apolitical experts
but rather as entities that were susceptible to “capture” by the regulated
industry.143 Yet even as the capture theory took hold, certain underpinnings of
the expertise model—specifically, the notion that agencies had a duty to
deliberate to “choose the good”—continued to persist in judges’ minds.144
Courts, accordingly, sought to shape administrative law doctrine in a way that
would enable them to smoke out agency capture and to force agencies to
engage in technocratic decisionmaking open to participation by varying
interest groups such that the public interest (rather than special interests)
would be served.145 Hard look review was one of the main tools that the courts
developed to ensure that agencies were looking at the statute and the evidence
and were choosing answers that served the public good. In this sense, hard
look review actually embraced certain aspects of the original expertise-based
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In the 1930s, James Landis served as a member of the FTC, a member of the SEC, and chair
of the SEC. See Carl McFarland, Landis’ Report: The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47
VA. L. REV. 373, 374 n.2 (1961).
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154-55 (1938).
See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 62-63 (describing how the “New Deal ideal of government by
experts that flourished in the 1930s and 1940s began to tarnish badly in the fifties”); see also
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749,
1761 (2007) (noting that by the 1970s, “[e]xperience had bred a certain amount of
skepticism about the expertise model”).
See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 62-66 (noting that the capture theory described the
phenomenon of how agencies that regulate particular industries over time “tend . . . to see
the world more and more the way the industry sees it” and begin “to regulate in the interest
of the regulated”); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the capture
theory).
See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 75 (noting that judges insisted that “agencies make right
decisions clearly and consciously directed by properly articulated public values and resting
on correct technical analysis”).
See id. (noting that courts viewed it as their duty to make sure that agencies “deliberated
rightly,” which meant that the agency had deliberated “in the way a moral philosopher
armed with technical as well as moral knowledge would deliberate” to “choose the good”);
Bressman, supra note 142, at 1761 (noting that hard look’s reasoned decisionmaking
requirement reflected an interest group representation model, which sought to promote
participation in the decisionmaking process by all affected interests).
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model of agency decisionmaking—specifically, those aspects that viewed
agency decisionmaking as involving pursuit of the public good through a
technocratic process.
By the 1980s, administrative law took yet another turn by moving to
embrace a new model of agency decisionmaking: the “political control”
model.146 This model, which has since gained widespread acceptance,147
acknowledges that many policymaking decisions made by agencies cannot be
resolved through a myopic technocratic lens but rather are highly political
decisions that should be made by politically accountable institutions.148 The
political control model of agency decisionmaking, accordingly, legitimizes
agency decisionmaking by stressing that agencies are subject to political
control.
Most scholars see political control of the administrative state as resting with
the President due to the unique role he plays in overseeing agency action.149
The President, for example, can steer administrative agencies through his
146.
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149.

See Bressman, supra note 142, at 1763 (“By the 1980s, administrative law theory and doctrine
had transitioned to presidential control of agency decisionmaking as a principal mechanism
for legitimating such decisionmaking.”); David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the
Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1370-77 (2007) (noting the shift from expertise
toward a political model of agency decisionmaking); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 1.7,
at 25-26 (describing increased focus on presidential control over the administrative state);
Kagan, supra note 4 (describing the rise in the presidential control model of agency
decisionmaking).
See James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview
and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 851-53 (2001) (describing the
widespread belief in presidential regulatory review); Bressman, supra note 142, at 1764
(noting that the presidential control model enjoys “bipartisan political appeal” and “broad
scholarly appeal” and that it “has enjoyed widespread support”); cf. Matthew C.
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 59 (2008)
(noting that “[s]cholars with diverse ideological and methodological commitments have
asserted that . . . bureaucratic policy should track majoritarian values and that this goal is
best advanced by giving decision-making authority to the most politically accountable
officials,” which implies “the need for presidential control over bureaucratic policymaking,
because the president is the institutional actor most responsive to the preferences of a
national majority”).
See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 1.7, at 25-26 (discussing the recognition that
policymaking is political).
See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 147, at 855 (“[C]entralized presidential review of agency
regulatory activity is an understandable and salutary development.”); Philip J. Harter,
Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568
(1987) (“We vote for presidents, not secretaries or administrators. . . . White House
oversight places accountability precisely where it should be, namely, where the electorate
can do something about it.”); Kagan, supra note 4, at 2384 (“Presidential administration . . .
advances political accountability by subjecting the bureaucracy to the control mechanism
most open to public examination and most responsive to public opinion.”).
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power to appoint and to remove executive officials.150 In addition, presidents
increasingly have put specific mechanisms into place to achieve greater
regulatory control, including various executive orders issued by recent
presidents that seek to control agencies and to subject them to oversight by the
OMB.151
Other scholars who subscribe to the political control model, however, focus
on Congress rather than the President.152 Among these scholars are positive
political theorists.153 These scholars emphasize how Congress can use a number
of formal and informal tools to exert oversight and influence over agency
policymaking, including Congress’s ability to hold oversight hearings
(sometimes called “police patrols”) and its ability to respond to alarms sounded

150.

151.

152.

153.
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The President’s appointment powers are spelled out in the Constitution in the
“Appointments Clause.” See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although there is no equivalent
“Removal Clause,” the Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot constrain the
President’s removal power over executive officials in a way that would unduly interfere with
the President’s constitutionally appointed duty under Article II to faithfully execute the
laws. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). The Supreme Court is poised to speak to
the issue of removal again this Term in a pending case involving the constitutionality of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (U.S.
May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861).
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3
C.F.R. 323 (1986); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); see also Nicholas Bagley &
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260,
1261 (2006) (describing how Reagan “tapped the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
to review agency rulemaking and help streamline the administrative state”); Blumstein,
supra note 147, at 863-70 (describing the Reagan and Clinton Administration’s embrace of
executive orders to structure regulatory review).
See generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 64-65
(2006) (observing that presidential control over administration has received significant legal
attention but that Congress’s role in administration has been “insufficiently noted”); Zaring
& Baylis, supra note 146, at 1371 (contrasting how some theorists “have focused their
attention on congressional control of agencies and have addressed the competence of
agencies to act by considering how Congress would oversee their actions” whereas
“Presidentialists, on the other hand, have cited the political choices that agencies make with
the president and have characterized agency action as subject to strong presidential
control”).
See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L.
REV. 431 (1989); Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). See generally
David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory
of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 414-15 (1997) (describing positive political
theorists’ focus on Congress’s control over agencies).
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by constituents (often called “fire-alarm” oversight).154 Congress also, of
course, possesses the power of the purse and thus can exercise oversight over
agencies by controlling their financial resources.155 In addition, Congress (or
committees or small groups of Congressmen) can informally supervise
agencies through a “variety of forms, including cajoling, adverse publicity,
audits, investigations, committee hearings, factfinding missions, informal
contacts with agency members and staff, and pressure on the President to
appoint persons chosen by members of Congress to agency positions.”156
Whether defined in terms of attention on the President or on Congress, the
general scholarly embrace of the “political control” model began to gain
traction in the courts in the 1980s. Most prominently, in 1984, the Supreme
Court handed down Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,157 its now famous decision establishing the Chevron “two-step.”158 In the
course of explaining why courts should defer to agencies’ reasonable
constructions of statutory ambiguities, Justice John Paul Stevens’s opinion
stated:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely
upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .159
As this passage suggests, the rule of deference set forth in Chevron
ultimately has been read to rest on a presumption of Congress’s delegatory
intent: courts must defer to agency interpretations where Congress intends the

154.
155.

156.
157.
158.

159.

See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 153, at 165-66.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”). See generally Beermann, supra note 152,
at 84 (“The power of the purse is among Congress’s most potent weapons in its effort to
control the execution of the laws.”).
Beermann, supra note 152, at 70.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
For some examples of articles discussing the significance and implications of the Chevron
doctrine, see, for example, Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002); and Kathryn A. Watts,
Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997 (2007).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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agency rather than the courts to make an interpretive judgment.160 However,
the Court’s decision also acknowledges openly that presidential influences can
validly impact an agency’s interpretive decisions where Congress has chosen to
delegate interpretive powers to executive agencies.161 Thus, unlike the Court’s
1983 decision in State Farm, which was silent about the relevance of political
factors, Chevron underscored the relevance of political influences (and political
accountability) to agencies’ interpretive processes. For this reason, Chevron can
be seen as having “anchor[ed] the presidential control model.”162
Other cases also have helped to solidify a place for political control of the
regulatory state. Sierra Club v. Costle, a significant decision handed down by
the D.C. Circuit in 1981, is one such case.163 In Costle, the D.C. Circuit
considered a challenge brought against a rule adopted by the EPA governing
emissions from coal burning power plants. Among the many challenges raised
was a claim that improper political arm-twisting had taken place during
postcomment, undocketed communications between the EPA and political
actors, including a U.S. Senator, the President of the United States, White
House staff, and other executive branch members.164 In rejecting the argument
that the alleged congressional pressure was improper, the court in an opinion
by Judge Patricia Wald165 held that it was “entirely proper for Congressional
representatives vigorously to represent the interests of their constituents before
administrative agencies engaged in informal, general policy rulemaking, so
long as individual Congressmen do not frustrate the intent of Congress as a
whole as expressed in statute, nor undermine applicable rules of procedure.”166
In terms of the intra-executive communications, the court held that these
too were unproblematic, going to great lengths to describe the need for the
executive branch to “monitor the consistency of executive agency regulations
with Administration policy.”167 The court noted that the President and his
advisers “surely must be briefed fully and frequently about rules in the making,

160.
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See generally Merrill & Watts, supra note 158, at 479 (describing how the Court has made
clear that “Chevron deference is grounded in a congressional intent to delegate primary
interpretive authority to the agency”).
See generally Bressman, supra note 142, at 1764 (noting that Chevron is the “[m]ost
prominent example” of how administrative law now reflects the presidential control model).
Id. at 1765.
657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 386-91.
Judge Wald had served as a “subcabinet appointee in the Carter administration.” EDLEY,
supra note 4, at 178.
Costle, 657 F.2d at 409.
Id. at 405.
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and their contributions to policymaking considered,” and it explained that
“[o]ur form of government simply could not function effectively or rationally if
key executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief
Executive.”168 The court acknowledged that allowing agencies to face
undisclosed presidential prodding might mean that an agency reaches “an
outcome that is factually based on the record, but different from the outcome
that would have obtained in the absence of Presidential involvement.”169
However, the court was unconcerned by this possibility, noting that it did “not
believe that Congress intended that the courts convert informal rulemaking
into a rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations or the
presence of Presidential power.”170 Costle, accordingly, quite clearly embraces
the political control model by expressing the view that informal rulemaking is a
politically influenced process, not a technocratic process that must mimic the
sanitized process used in a courthouse.
Even though the political control model has been accepted in a variety of
administrative law doctrines ranging from ex parte communications in Costle to
judicial review of agency legal interpretations under Chevron, hard look review
continues to insist on technocratic rather than political decisionmaking when it
comes to agencies’ reason-giving duties.171 This means that one major
advantage of rethinking hard look review as this Article proposes is that hard
look could be better harmonized with administrative law’s current embrace of
political decisionmaking.172 This would bring greater coherence to
administrative law doctrine and theory by helping to resolve some of the
current vacillation between politics and expertise.

168.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 405-06; see also id. at 400 n.502 (“Democratic ideology requires control of
administrative action by elected representatives of the people.” (quoting Seymour Scher,
Conditions for Legislative Control, 25 J. POL. 526, 526 (1963))).
Id. at 408.
Id.
See supra Part I.
One could argue that instead of altering hard look review’s expert-driven slant to bring it in
line with the presidential control model, an alternative might be to alter other administrative
law doctrines to bring them in line with hard look’s expert-driven model. This approach,
however, would be undesirable for several reasons. Most prominently, moving away from
administrative law’s current political control model would reduce the opportunity for
political accountability and monitoring of agencies. Cf. infra Section II.D. (discussing
accountability benefits).
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B. Creating Better Separation Between Science and Politics
Second, encouraging agencies to disclose political factors could help to take
some of the political pressure off of science, creating a more effective separation
between science and politics.173 Under the current technocratic model’s focus
on facts and evidence, agencies have an incentive to dress up their decisions in
technocratic terms and to hide political influences. Agencies, accordingly, may
well be tempted to align facts and science with political choices rather than
giving science its own rightful place that is separate from political or valueladen considerations.174
Concerns along these lines surfaced regularly during the Bush
Administration. For example, in the global warming context, the Bush White
House was accused of attempting to rewrite an EPA report in order to
downplay the risks of global warming,175 and in 2005, a NASA official accused
the Administration of trying to keep him from discussing the effects of global
warming.176 Even more recently, allegations surfaced in 2008 that Vice
President Dick Cheney’s office “remov[ed] statements on health risks posed by
global warming from a draft of a health official’s Senate testimony [in
2007].”177
Outside of the global warming context, similar charges were raised against
the Bush Administration. In 2004, for example, more than sixty leading
scientists, including twenty Nobel laureates, issued a statement accusing the
173.

174.

175.
176.
177.
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For an interesting book on the general ways in which politics may intrude on science, see
RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006). See also Wendy E. Wagner, The
Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995) (arguing that
“agencies exaggerate the contributions made by science in setting toxic standards in order to
avoid accountability for the underlying policy decisions”).
President Obama has taken steps to ensure that agencies do not distort science to serve
political goals—most recently issuing a directive that seeks to guarantee scientific integrity.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Puts His Own Spin on the Mix of Science with Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at A18 (discussing Obama’s directive to “guarantee scientific
integrity, in federal policy making”). Obama’s directive has been read to seek to separate
scientific judgments from policy judgments so that scientists are not making policy but
rather are merely providing the best available scientific information to policymakers, who
then may take both science and politics into account in setting policy. Cf. id. (noting that the
directive “will not divorce science from politics, or strip ideology from presidential
decisions”).
See Jeremy Symons, How Bush and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B4.
Juliet Eilperin, Putting Some Heat on Bush: Scientist Inspires Anger, Awe for Challenges on
Global Warming, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2005, at A17.
Andrew C. Revkin, Cheney’s Office Said To Edit Draft Testimony on Warming, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2008, at A12.
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Bush Administration of distorting scientific evidence in order to serve political
goals.178 In addition, in 2007, former Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona
accused the Bush Administration of muzzling him and preventing him from
speaking on politically sensitive topics like stem cell research and the
emergency contraceptive Plan B.179
Regardless of whether or not these sorts of allegations are true (a question
that this Article does not purport to resolve), the mere existence and frequency
of such allegations suggests that the current demand for technical, scientific,
expert-driven explanations from agencies may have elevated the stakes of
science. Giving politics its own discrete, transparent, judicially-accepted role in
agency rulemaking processes likely would help to take some of the pressure off
of science. Politics and science, in other words, could each operate more
appropriately if given their own respective spheres.
C. Softening the “Ossification” Charge
Third, embracing a role for politics would give agencies yet another way to
justify their rulemaking decisions and thus courts would have yet another
potential reason to defer to agencies’ decisions. This, in turn, could help to
soften the “ossification” charge frequently leveled against arbitrary and
capricious review.180 Essentially, those who assert that our current version of
arbitrary and capricious review has “ossified” the rulemaking process note that
hard look review has pushed agencies to draft lengthy statements of basis and
purpose filled with lengthy explanations and data that courts ultimately “may,
or may not, consider an adequate response to the 10,000-1,000,000 pages of
comments” received by the agency.181 Some critics claim that this type of

178.

179.
180.

181.

See James Glanz, Scientists Say Administration Distorts Facts: Accusations Include Suppressing
Reports and Stacking Committees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at A18; Guy Gugliotta & Rick
Weiss, President’s Science Policy Questioned: Scientists Worry that Any Politics Will Compromise
Their Credibility, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2004, at A2; Andrew C. Revkin, Bush vs. the
Laureates: How Science Became a Partisan Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at F1.
Christopher Lee, Ex-Surgeon General Says White House Hushed Him, WASH. POST, July 11,
2007, at A1.
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV.
59, 93-95 (1995); Paul R. Verkuil, Comment, Rulemaking Ossification—A Modest Proposal, 47
ADMIN. L. REV. 453, 457-58 (1995); see also supra note 124 and accompanying text (citing
ossification literature).
Pierce, supra note 125, at 920; see also Jordan, supra note 124, at 395 (summarizing
ossification arguments made by opponents of hard look review).
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unpredictable judicial review has led certain agencies to stop using informal
rulemaking and to turn to other modes of policymaking instead.182
If agencies were allowed to justify their decisions in both technocratic and
political terms, then these sorts of “ossification” charges likely would be
softened because courts would have yet another reason to uphold agency
decisions.183 In other words, if political influences could serve as yet another
kind of reason justifying agency action, then agency decisions might be more
likely to withstand judicial review and thus agencies might be more willing to
engage in informal rulemaking. Although this alone might not be a sufficient
reason for embracing political influences in the rulemaking realm, it
nonetheless is a benefit that—when combined with even more compelling
benefits, such as bringing greater coherence to administrative law and
separating politics from science—suggests the value of giving politics a proper
place.
D. Enabling Greater Political Accountability
Finally, a fourth significant reason (and perhaps the most important
reason) for giving politics a place in agency rulemaking involves political
accountability. Encouraging agencies to disclose political factors rather than
hiding behind technocratic façades would enable more political influences to
come out into the open, thereby enabling greater political accountability and
monitoring.184
As Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman has explained, hard look review’s
reasoned decisionmaking requirement can be thought of as serving a
significant “monitoring” purpose: by requiring agencies to explain their
decisions in a transparent manner, political actors and their constituents gain
access to information about agency action and can monitor agencies.185 The
problem, of course, is that hard look review currently incentivizes agencies to

182.
183.

184.

185.
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See Jordan, supra note 124, at 394.
Cf. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2382-83 (noting that enabling politics to play a role in hard look
review would help to respond to the ossification charge often levied against hard look review
because “courts would have an additional reason to defer to administrative decisions in
which the President has played a role” and hence courts would reverse agency decisions less
often).
See Mendelson, supra note 123, at 34 (arguing that the fact that presidential influences on
agencies are currently not transparent “has significant adverse consequences, both for the
appropriateness of presidential influence and for the legitimacy of agency decision
making”); see also EDLEY, supra note 4, at 22 (noting that political accountability is one of the
positive norms associated with decisions based on politics).
Bressman, supra note 142, at 1780.
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disclose only certain decisionmaking factors—scientific, technical, or statutory
factors—that are likely to gain judicial approval. Thus, political factors
influencing agency decisions are kept out of the public’s eye and are not subject
to open public scrutiny. This creates a type of monitoring gap: an agency’s
scientific and technocratic reasoning can be closely monitored, whereas
political influences directed toward agencies by Congress or the President will
not be publicly disclosed and thus will not be subject to the same type of
monitoring and accountability.186 This monitoring gap would be reduced
(although likely not completely eliminated) if courts applied arbitrary and
capricious review in a way that gave political influences an accepted place in
rulemaking decisions.187
The accountability benefits that would flow from expanding arbitrary and
capricious review should follow regardless of whether independent or executive
agencies are involved. Independent agencies do enjoy some job protection in
terms of being insulated from the President’s broad removal powers.188
However, the fact that they are not subject to the President’s unfettered
removal powers does not mean that the President lacks the ability to exert
influence over independent agencies in other ways, such as informal
contacts.189 In addition, independent agencies certainly are not independent of
Congress, which can control agencies’ budgets, jurisdiction, and statutory

186.

187.

188.

189.

See Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U.
L. REV. 443, 457 (1987) (arguing that because agencies do not disclose ex parte influences
from the President, “[t]he public cannot judge the President’s reasons or motivations in
deciding how to vote in the next election because the public is never even aware of the
intervention, much less of its content”).
The monitoring gap would not be completely eliminated, even if politics were given an
accepted place, if agencies were allowed to choose to disclose only some political influences
and not others. See generally infra Section IV.B. (discussing whether disclosure of political
influences should be mandated).
See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding limits on the
President’s ability to remove a member of the FTC, an independent regulatory
commission).
See 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.9, at 500-01 (noting that the President can exert control over
policymaking by independent agencies through informal means, such as by simply calling or
having a subordinate call “the critical decisionmakers at the agency to express the
President’s views”); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 498 (2008)
(concluding that institutional designs to insulate independent agencies do not mean that
Presidents lack control over agencies and noting that “there is good reason to think that
independent agencies will adhere to presidential preferences once a majority of
commissioners are from the President’s party”).
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commands.190 As Justice Scalia recently put it, “independent agencies are
sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed
that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply
been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction.”191
One key to achieving monitoring and accountability benefits must be
stressed: courts would have to be clear that political influences can help to
justify agency decisions only when agencies openly and transparently disclose
such influences in their rulemaking records.192 This means that the agency
would need to expressly reference the political influences in its public
rulemaking documents, such as a notice of proposed rulemaking, a statement
of basis and purpose accompanying a final rule, or a statement explaining the
denial of a rulemaking petition pursuant to section 555(e) of the APA. If a court
could discern by, for example, combing public press accounts, that presidential
policy likely influenced an agency’s rulemaking proceeding but the agency
failed to disclose the political influence in its rulemaking record, then the court
could not credit the presidential policy as a factor supporting the rulemaking.
Rather, in order to permit the reasoned decisionmaking requirement to serve
its monitoring purpose, courts would need to enforce the well-established rule
that “an administrative order must be judged” solely “upon [those grounds]
which the record discloses that [the] action was based.”193 Courts, in other
words, would need to refuse to “‘rummag[e]’ through the record to elicit” a
rationale not clearly relied upon by the agency.194 Agencies themselves would
face the burden of sufficiently indicating the reasons for their actions in
regulatory documents. This rule, which flows from the famous Chenery
decisions decided by the Supreme Court in 1943 and 1947, serves to ensure that
agencies disclose all of the evidence and reasoning on which they wish to rely
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See generally Beermann, supra note 152, at 109 (noting that independent agencies “are
supposed to be insulated from politics, but the truth is that while the independent agencies
may be insulated from the President, they are often much more responsive to direct (albeit
informal) congressional supervision than agencies within the executive branch”).
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) (emphasis added).
Edley previously reached a similar conclusion about the importance of bringing political
influences out into the open. See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 190-91 (“The disclosure of the
subjective, ideological, and electoral factors that influence the agency’s decision is a crucial
step toward disciplining them. The failure of courts to demand disclosure encourages secret
politics, pretermitting the process of continuing, between-elections political
accountability.”).
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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in defending their decisions.195 If certain political influences factoring into an
agency’s rulemaking decision were not set forth by the agency in its rulemaking
record with “such clarity as to be understandable,”196 then the monitoring
function would not be fulfilled.
iii. the mechanics of giving politics a place
It is fairly easy to articulate the reasons why arbitrary and capricious review
should be altered to embrace a role for political influences. It is more difficult
to articulate precisely when political influences should be accepted in
rulemaking decisions and when they should not be since the inquiry is likely to
depend on the facts of each particular case. Despite the challenges of
articulating generally applicable principles, this Part attempts to sketch out the
mechanics of how political influences could be embraced by arbitrary and
capricious review by addressing four specific questions. First, when should
statutes be read as signaling Congress’s intent to allow or disallow any agency
reliance upon political influences? Second, assuming that Congress has not
prohibited an agency from relying upon political factors in a particular
statutory scheme, what types of political influences should count as legitimate
factors (rather than corrupting factors) when openly and transparently
disclosed by the agency? Third, who stands as a potential source of legitimate
political influence? Finally, fourth, what specific types of rulemaking decisions
might most appropriately be influenced by political factors?
A. Determining Congress’s Intent Regarding Political Factors
It is a well-accepted rule of administrative law that federal administrative
agencies, which act pursuant to congressional delegations of power, must act
consistent with congressional intent and must consider only factors that
Congress intended the agency to consider.197 This means that if a statute

195.

196.
197.

See Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947) (reiterating the rule that “a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or
judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the
propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency”).
Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196.
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider . . . .”); JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD
A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM
294 (5th ed. 2003) (“[A]gencies empowered by Congress to regulate may do so only if
consistent with their underlying statutory mandates.”).
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expressly indicates Congress’s decision to foreclose a certain factor, such as
economic or political factors, from an agency’s decisionmaking calculus, then
the agency plainly should not be allowed to rely upon that factor in justifying
its decision.198 The key, accordingly, is to determine Congress’s intent.
Occasionally, Congress will make its intent known by explicitly or
implicitly prohibiting agencies from considering certain decisional factors that
might otherwise logically be relevant to the agency’s decisionmaking
process.199 One prominent example of this can be found in the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) enacted by Congress in 1973.200 Under the ESA, the
Secretary of the Interior must determine by regulation whether or not a species
qualifies as endangered or threatened because of any of five specified factors.201
In making an assessment based on the five factors, the ESA directs that the
Secretary must make a determination “solely on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available . . . after conducting a review of the status of the
species and after taking into account those efforts, if any, being made by any
State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of a State or foreign nation,
to protect such species.”202 Thus, because the statute itself requires the agency
to rely solely on the “best science” available when making listing decisions, the
Secretary is foreclosed from considering other factors, such as economic and
political considerations.203 This has led one former Secretary of the Interior,
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Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that an administrative
rulemaking may be overturned on the grounds of political pressure if the “content of the
pressure . . . is designed to force [the agency] to decide upon factors not made relevant by
Congress in the applicable statute” and if the agency’s determination was actually affected by
the “extraneous considerations”) (emphasis added).
See generally Richard J. Pierce, What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4, on file with The Yale Law Journal),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1157497 (“Congress rarely
explicitly forbids an agency from considering a decisional factor that is logically relevant to a
decision or class of decisions. It sometimes chooses decisional standards that implicitly
preclude consideration of a logically relevant decisional factor, however.”).
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
Id. § 1533(a)(1).
Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
But see Holly Doremus, Using Science in a Political World: The Importance of Transparency in
Natural Resource Regulation, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 143, 164 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006)
(noting that “[n]atural resource management decisions [such as those made under the
ESA], although they appear superficially to be dictated by scientific information, in fact can
hide numerous judgments,” such as policy-driven and politically-driven judgments). See
generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding in the famous “snail darter”
case that the ESA placed an “incalculable” value on endangered species and thus did not
empower the courts to weigh the economic cost of halting completion of a dam against the
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Dirk Kempthorne, to call the ESA “perhaps the least flexible law Congress has
ever enacted.”204
As Secretary Kempthorne’s comment suggests, most statutes delegating
rulemaking powers to agencies are not as rigid as the ESA. In fact, for most
statutory schemes, no clear line separates those “permissible” factors that may
be taken into account from those that are “impermissible.” In particular,
statutes delegating rulemaking powers to agencies generally have little, if
anything, to say about Congress’s views on the propriety of agency
consideration of political influences, such as presidential consultation or
congressional pressure.205 This congressional silence could plausibly be read in
one of two ways: congressional silence about the propriety of consideration of
political factors forecloses agencies from considering such factors,206 or
alternatively Congress’s silence leaves agencies free to consider political factors
and influences.207 If congressional silence were read to mean the former, then
the proposal set forth in this Article advocating for a place for politics in agency
rulemaking would quite plainly flout congressional design.
A line of D.C. Circuit cases suggests an answer, supporting the view that
when Congress is silent (i.e., when it is silent with respect to whether a
logically relevant factor may be considered), Congress’s silence should be read
to leave room for the agency to consider the factor in its decisionmaking
process.208 For example, in a D.C. Circuit case decided in 1998 involving
whether the EPA had improperly considered international law and
international trade in crafting a new rule involving gasoline, the D.C. Circuit

204.
205.

206.

207.
208.

benefit of saving the snail darter species); W. Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
535 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Idaho 2007) (finding that the Fish and Wildlife Service acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when determining whether to list the greater sage-grouse under
the ESA by failing to use “best science” and by allowing extensive political interference by a
deputy assistant secretary in the Interior Department).
See The Threatened Polar Bear; It Gets Federal Protection, but Nothing To Save Its Habitat,
WASH. POST, May 15, 2008, at A14 (reporting on Kempthorne’s statement).
MASHAW ET AL., supra note 197, at 292 (“Virtually all statutes conveying rulemaking power
to executive (as well as ‘independent’) agencies are silent on such questions as whether the
agency head may consult with the President or his agents and, if so, on what basis.”).
One reason to read Congress’s silence this way might be that Congress could have legislated
against the backdrop of the current understanding of arbitrary and capricious review. In
other words, Congress might have remained silent in most statutes about what factors can
and cannot be considered by agencies because Congress assumed that the judicial pattern
favoring technocratic decisionmaking would prevail.
See 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.4, at 453.
See Warren v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA,
154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.4, at 453-55 (discussing the
D.C. Circuit’s cases on the issue).
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explained that it is generally reluctant “to infer from congressional silence an
intention to preclude the agency from considering factors other than those
listed in a statute.”209 This general rule about congressional silence rests on the
notion that “Congress always wants an agency to attempt to further a list of
societal goals that is far too long to incorporate in any statute.”210
A contrary rule—which would read congressional silence to mean the
exclusion of certain decisional factors, such as presidential communications—
would significantly undermine the currently accepted notion that
administrative agencies’ legitimacy hinges on politically accountable actors.211
As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “Americans rightly expect their elected
representatives to voice their grievances and preferences concerning the
administration of our laws.”212 Thus, if Congress’s silence in statutory schemes
about the relevance of presidential and congressional views were read to mean
that such factors cannot be considered by agencies, then agencies would be
deprived of “legitimate sources of information.”213 In addition, reading
Congress’s silence in this way would effectively mean that Congress has
stripped not just the President of his influence but also stripped its own
members of the ability to influence agency decisions through informal
congressional pressure, oversight hearings, or other congressional
communications—all tools that Congress uses on a regular basis.214
The text of the APA also lends support to the argument that Congress
generally does not intend to prohibit agencies from considering political
influences in the informal rulemaking context. The APA expressly regulates ex
parte contacts in the context of formal adjudications and formal rulemakings
required to be conducted on the record but not in the context of informal
notice-and-comment rulemakings.215 This suggests that Congress did not
intend to prohibit or limit ex parte communications, including those coming
from political actors, in informal rulemakings.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

215.
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Warren, 159 F.3d at 624.
1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.4, at 453 (citing MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 4, at 202-23
(1990)).
See supra Section I.A.
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 410.
Another reason to assume that Congress intended to allow politics to play a role in agency
decisions can be found—at least as to executive agencies—in Congress’s choices regarding
agency structure. By creating executive agencies whose heads are removable at will by the
President, Congress seems to have quite clearly accepted the notion that the President would
be allowed to influence agency decisions.
See Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist. v. Mar. Admin., 215 F.3d 37, 42-43 (2000) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§§ 553(c), 554(a), 557(d) (2000)).
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Despite the various reasons why the D.C. Circuit’s rule allowing
extrastatutory decisional factors makes sense, the Supreme Court recently
muddied the waters a bit. Most notably, in Massachusetts v. EPA,216 the
majority acknowledged that the EPA had given a “laundry list” of reasons not
to regulate, such as a desire to avoid inefficient, piecemeal regulation and a
desire to avoid interfering with the President’s own foreign policy initiatives.217
The Court, however, ultimately dismissed all of these policy-driven
considerations, declaring that they were “divorced from the statutory text.”218
The statute provided that the Administrator of the EPA “shall by regulation
prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any
class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in
his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”219 According to the Court,
the EPA was required to “ground its reasons for action or inaction in the
statute.”220
The Court’s conclusion—that the EPA’s justifications for declining to defer
were divorced from the statutory text—is somewhat confusing because, as
Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the statutory text “says
nothing at all about the reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a
judgment.”221 Instead, the statutory text expressly dictates only that when the
Administrator actually “makes a judgment [about] whether to regulate
greenhouse gases, that judgment must relate to whether they are air pollutants
that ‘cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare.’”222 Massachusetts, accordingly, could very
easily be read as a rejection of the D.C. Circuit’s rule that congressional silence
leaves agencies with ample room to consider extrastatutory decisional
factors.223 Although at least one commentator has read Massachusetts this

216.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

549 U.S. 497 (2007). Another case recently decided by the Supreme Court, National Ass’n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007), also arguably confuses matters
a bit. For a detailed discussion of the significance of National Ass’n of Home Builders, see
Pierce, supra note 199, at 14-18.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added).
Id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)).
Cf. id. (noting that the statutory text is “silent, as texts are often silent about permissible
reasons for the exercise of agency discretion”). See generally Pierce, supra note 199, at 14 (“I
have no doubt that many petitioners will argue that Massachusetts . . . stand[s] for the
proposition that congressional silence with respect to a decisional factor should be
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way,224 there is reason to doubt that the Court would follow this reading of
Massachusetts in future cases.225
First, although the majority in Massachusetts chastised the EPA for basing
its decision on factors divorced from the statutory text, the Court did not
definitively say that the EPA’s decision about whether or not to regulate had to
be based solely on factors that are embraced by the statutory text. Instead, the
Court expressly noted at the end of its decision that it was not reaching the
question of whether “policy concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event
that [the EPA] makes” an endangerment finding.226 In other words, the Court
seems to have left the door open for the agency to decline to regulate for policy
reasons not set forth in the statutory text after the EPA exercised its expertise to
assess whether greenhouse gases endanger the public health and welfare.227
Furthermore, in embracing a deferential standard of review for denials of
rulemaking petitions, the Court at least implicitly recognized that policy-driven
considerations might impact an agency’s decision about whether or not to
regulate, noting that “an agency has broad discretion to choose how best to
marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its delegated
responsibilities.”228
Second, Massachusetts was not a normal, run-of-the mill case: Massachusetts
dealt with global warming, an issue that many consider the most important
environmental issue of our time.229 The case resulted in a sharp 5-4 split among

224.
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228.
229.
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interpreted as congressional rejection of that factor and as a prohibition on agency
consideration of that factor in making decisions . . . .”).
See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727,
740 (2009) (arguing that Massachusetts supports the general principle that “when an agency
decides whether to take even preliminary steps in the regulatory process that might lead to
rulemaking, it must consider Congress’s factors rather than the agency’s or the
administration’s preferred factors”); cf. Pierce, supra note 199, at 12-13 (“I fear that the
majority opinion in Massachusetts will be interpreted to reject the long line of D.C. Circuit
opinions in which that court has interpreted congressional silence to permit an agency to
consider a logically relevant decisional factor . . . .”).
Pierce, supra note 199, at 18 (“I doubt that any Justice actually wants lower courts to
interpret Massachusetts . . . to stand for the broad proposition that congressional silence with
respect to a factor that is logically relevant to an agency decision must be interpreted to
prohibit the agency from considering the factor.”).
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534-35.
See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 85, at 1043.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527 (noting that the scope of review is narrow).
See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 85, at 1043; see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535
(noting that petitioners seeking certiorari called global warming “the most pressing
environmental challenge of our time”); Examining the Case for the California Waiver: Before
the S. Subcomm. on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, 110th Cong. 27 (2007) (statement of
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the justices down ideological lines. Thus, the majority’s willingness to stretch
to read congressional silence in the statute in a way that seriously constrained
the hands of the EPA might be limited to the specifics of the immensely
important and highly political case.230 In future cases, the Court could simply
choose to limit its reasoning in Massachusetts to the specific provisions of the
Clean Air Act at issue in Massachusetts rather than to draw broader, more
general principles from the case about the permissibility of basing agency
decisions on nonstatutory factors.231
Finally, just this past Term the Court issued a divided decision, Entergy
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, in which a different majority of the Court embraced the
notion that congressional silence “represents ambiguity and an invitation for
the [relevant agency] to decide for itself which factors should govern its
regulatory approach.”232 In Entergy, the Justices split over whether “cost” was
an appropriate factor to be considered by the EPA in making decisions under a
specific section of the Clean Water Act, which directs the EPA to require that
certain water intake structures “reflect the best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”233 Justice Scalia writing for a
majority of the Court read Congress’s silence about the propriety of
considering “cost” to mean that the agency—relying upon Chevron deference—
could reasonably conclude that a cost-benefit analysis was an appropriate
decisional factor. Specifically, Justice Scalia explained that he read Congress’s
silence in the relevant statute “to convey nothing more than a refusal to tie the
agency’s hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so to

230.
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233.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Att’y Gen. of California) (“Global warming is the most important
environmental and public health issue we face today.”).
See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 85, at 1043; cf. Pierce, supra note 199, at 18 (discussing
how the justices’ conclusions in Massachusetts were driven more by politics than by legal
doctrine). The notion that judges should play a special role in environmental law cases—
although never embraced openly by the Supreme Court—has been expressly articulated by
some judges, including Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def.
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“Decisions in
areas touching the environment or medicine affect the lives and health of all. These
interests, like the First Amendment, have ‘always had a special claim to judicial
protection.’”); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
For example, Massachusetts could be viewed as resting on very particular aspects of the Clean
Air Act, including the fact that the statute provided that the Administrator “shall by
regulation prescribe . . . standards” rather than using the term “may.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)
(2000) (emphasis added). See Pierce, supra note 199, at 15 (noting the potential relevance of
the word “shall”).
129 S. Ct. 1498, 1518 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s
approach).
See id. at 1516; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2000).
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what degree.”234 In contrast, Justice Stevens writing for himself, then-Justice
Souter and Justice Ginsburg in dissent determined that Congress had chosen
not to authorize cost-benefit analysis and that “Congress intended to control,
not delegate, when cost-benefit analysis should be used.”235 In this sense,
Massachusetts and Entergy suggest diverging approaches to congressional
silence about the propriety of decisional factors—leaving it far from clear that
Massachusetts should be read to mark out a definitive path on the subject.
For these and other reasons,236 Massachusetts should not be read to signal a
new take on congressional silence—at least not until the Court has a chance to
openly grapple with the issue. Rather, it makes sense to continue to follow the
D.C. Circuit’s rule on congressional silence, giving agencies the freedom to
consider any factors that are logically relevant to agency decisions so long as
Congress has not prohibited the agency from considering the factor. For
purposes of the proposal set forth in this Article, adherence to this rule would
mean that unless a statute explicitly or implicitly forecloses political
considerations from an agency’s calculus altogether (as the ESA’s “best science”
standard appears to do with respect to the listing of endangered species),
agencies remain free to take some kinds of political influences into
consideration in their rulemaking proceedings. In other words, a presumption
would exist that when Congress is silent on the matter, Congress intended
agencies to be able to consider all factors that are rationally and logically
relevant to the agency’s decision, including certain political influences.237 This,
however, simply begs yet another question: where should the line be drawn
between rational and logically relevant political influences that we can presume
Congress intended the agency to be able to consider versus those sorts of
corrupting political influences that Congress would not intend an agency to
consider?238
234.
235.
236.
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129 S. Ct. at 1508.
Id. at 1518 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See generally Pierce, supra note 199, at 14-18 (detailing various additional reasons why
Massachusetts should not be read to mean that congressional silence on a factor forecloses
agency consideration of the factor).
Cf. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2326-31 (suggesting that congressional delegations to agencies to
engage in rulemaking that are silent on the issue of presidential involvement should
presumptively be read to permit presidential guidance).
If Congress cannot be presumed to have intended the agency to consider a certain factor,
then the agency plainly should not be allowed to consider it. In other words, the President
or other political actors should not be allowed to inject decisional factors that Congress
cannot be presumed to have intended the agency to consider. If the rule were otherwise,
then we would be acknowledging the lack of legal constraints governing the delegation of
power to the executive branch. In light of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), such a lack of legal constraints would in turn suggest

WATTS_119_2.DOC

proposing a place for politics

B. Types of Political Factors That Might Appropriately Be Relied Upon
Clearly not all political influences should be viewed as legitimate but
neither should all political influences be treated as illegitimate. In thinking
about how judges might approach this problem of line drawing, it is helpful to
look to work by Cass Sunstein and other proponents of “civic republicanism”
who have detailed as a descriptive matter how judges seek to (and as a
normative matter how they ought to seek to) ensure that challenged
governmental decisions implicating constitutional and administrative law
issues are supported by some kind of “public value” rather than by a mere
“naked preference” for one group over another.239 In other words, civic
republicans assert that judges generally seek to ensure that political actors
reflect on the public good and make decisions designed to advance the public
interest and public values rather than merely caving to interest group
pressure.240
Leaving aside the normative question of whether judges ought to be
searching for public values to support governmental decisions, the descriptive
thesis seems quite powerful and persuasive: judges routinely seek out public
justifications to support challenged governmental action. Judges, for example,
are quite comfortable concluding that a statute is constitutional because it
furthers some kind of reasonable or legitimate governmental interest,241 but
they would not be comfortable saying a statute is constitutional simply because
it was approved by a majority of Congress and signed by the President.
Assuming that this descriptive picture of courts is correct and that the
judiciary does in fact seek to locate public values to support governmental
action, then it seems inconceivable that the courts would suddenly become

239.

240.

241.

the unavailability of judicial review because the question would rest within the President’s
discretion and thus would be political, not legal, in nature.
See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1511 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked
Preferences].
See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 239, at 63 (“Reviewing courts are attempting to
ensure that the agency has not merely responded to political pressure but that it is instead
deliberating in order to identify and implement the public values that should control the
controversy.”).
Cf. Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 239, at 1692 (“The ‘reasonableness’ constraint of
the due process clause is perhaps the most obvious example. The minimum requirement
that government decisions be something other than a raw exercise of political power has
been embodied in constitutional doctrine under the due process clause before, during, and
after the Lochner era.”).

53

WATTS_119_2.DOC

the yale law journal

119:2

2009

willing to embrace raw politics, crass political horse trading, or pure
partisanship as factors that could help to legitimize an agency’s decision. Nor
does it seem as a normative matter that courts ought to accept reliance on raw
politics or pure partisanship in the rulemaking realm given that Congress likely
did not intend such influences to be logically relevant decisional factors in an
agency’s rulemaking process.242 Put another way, courts should be weary of
political influences resting on pure partisan politics because such influences are
not tied to the public values or policies being implemented by the statutory
scheme and hence Congress cannot be presumed to have authorized agency
reliance on such factors.243 In contrast, it is much easier to presume that
Congress would view political considerations tied to policy choices or public
values falling within the general rubric of the statutory scheme as logically
relevant considerations that the agency was authorized to take into account in
implementing the statutory scheme.
Take, for example, a recent decision issued by the Eastern District of New
York, Tummino v. Torti.244 There, the district court reviewed the FDA’s
decision involving the nonprescription availability of the emergency
contraceptive Plan B. In asserting that the FDA’s action was not the product of
reasoned decisionmaking, the plaintiffs alleged that the FDA’s decisions were
improperly motivated by political considerations outside the scope of the
FDA’s statutory authority because “the FDA bowed to political pressure from
the White House and anti-abortion constituents despite the uniform
recommendation of the FDA’s scientific review staff to approve over-thecounter access to Plan B without limitation.”245 In agreeing with the plaintiffs
that the FDA’s decision was not the result of reasoned decision making, the
district court seemed unwilling to presume that Congress intended raw
political calculations (e.g., the desire to see success achieved in confirmation
hearings) as rationally or logically related to the agency’s statutory mandate.246
To take another example, imagine that the FDA during the Obama
Administration rescinded various preemption regulations promulgated during
the Bush Administration, and the FDA justified its decision by boldly stating:
“The President directed us to rescind the preemption regulations in order to
reward the trial lawyers, who provided significant campaign support to the
President.” Given that this explanation seeks to serve a private interest but not
any broader conception of the public good, it is highly unlikely that any court
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
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See supra notes 197-238 and accompanying text.
See id.
603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 538.
See id. at 546.
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today would view this as a legitimate factor supporting the FDA’s decision.
Nor should courts be willing to presume that Congress intended such raw
political calculations (i.e., the desire to feed an important campaign
contributor) as rationally or logically related to the agency’s statutory mandate.
Similarly, an agency’s assertion that it adopted a particular standard (such
as a standard setting permissible emission levels at 0.5 parts per million)
because “the President made us do it” should not fare any better.247 Allowing
an agency to base a decision on such a bald presidential direction—unbounded
by the relevant statutory scheme, facts, or evidence—would leave the President
with unfettered discretion to direct the outcome of an agency’s decision in a
way unconnected to any articulation of public values or the public interest.
This would be problematic for at least three reasons. First, as Professor Peter
Strauss has pointed out, accepting the notion that the President enjoys
unfettered discretion to direct an agency’s decision would run smack up against
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison suggesting the
unavailability of judicial review where a matter rests within the President’s
discretion and is political in nature.248 Second, it is highly unlikely that courts
would be willing to presume that Congress—having set up a statutory scheme
designed to direct and cabin the relevant agency’s discretion—nonetheless
intended for the President to enjoy unfettered discretion to direct the outcome
of the agency’s decision-making process. Finally, as Professor Mendelson has
concluded, allowing an agency to simply proclaim that the “President said so”
seems arbitrary because it does not seem to supply any reason at all.249
At the other end of the spectrum, when the EPA under the Obama
Administration issued its proposed rule in 2009 finding that greenhouse gases
do endanger the public health and welfare within the meaning of section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act,250 imagine that it had explained its decision by

247.

248.

249.
250.

See Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 21 (2001) (arguing that an agency’s claim that
“[t]he President made me do it” would delegitimize the agency action rather than count as a
“good” reason); see also Mendelson, supra note 123, at 52 (arguing that “[s]aying ‘The
President said so,’ seems arbitrary because it does not identify any more general principle
that might explain the choice made either within the agency or within the executive review
process”).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Peter L. Strauss, Legislation That Isn’t—Attending to
Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit,” 97 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009-2010) (manuscript at
11, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (arguing that if an agency based a decision on
political factors not authorized by Congress, this would “take us straight into the quagmire
suggested” by Marbury).
See Mendelson, supra note 123, at 52.
See Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (Apr. 24, 2009).
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pointing to factual and scientific evidence to support its conclusion and also by
stating: “Our conclusion that carbon dioxide emissions endanger the public
health and welfare serves the President’s overarching policy goal of protecting
the environment and is consistent with the President’s foreign policy
initiatives, including his promises to foreign leaders that he will work to
combat global warming to the extent possible.” This kind of political influence
speaks not in raw political terms but rather speaks to broader policy concerns
and public values that the Clean Air Act touches upon—namely, protecting the
environment. It, accordingly, is the type of political influence that courts
should feel much more comfortable allowing to help justify agency action.
As this discussion should make clear, trying to define what sorts of political
influences should be viewed as legitimate and which should be viewed as
illegitimate is not an easy task that can be summed up with a precise test.
However, it does seem clear that courts are unlikely to (and should be
unwilling to) view political arguments as rational statutory considerations
authorized by Congress when they are driven by pure partisanship or raw
politics. Conversely, courts ought to be much more likely to accept political
influences as congressionally authorized considerations where the political
factors seek to implement policy considerations or value judgments tied in
some sense to the statutory scheme being implemented.251 Thus, “legitimate”
political influences from political actors should be defined in a way that
includes policy considerations and political value judgments (e.g., “The
President favors a reading of the Clean Air Act that excludes greenhouse gases
from its coverage because the statute cannot work effectively or
comprehensively to deal with global warming.”), but excludes raw political
goals or pure partisan politics (e.g., “The President has directed us not to
regulate greenhouse gases because his key campaign contributors do not want
to incur regulatory costs associated with preventing global climate change.”).
Of course, the inherent fuzziness of the line between impermissible and
permissible political influences makes it possible that agencies could try to
manipulate the line by spinning partisan or raw political decisions as somehow
being driven by public values or policy choices. While this is certainly possible,
the harm of this possibility is minimized by the fact that, even under such a
“hide the ball” scenario, agencies at least will be acknowledging some kinds
(even if not all kinds) of political influences and thus will be opening the door

251.

56

Examples of legitimate policy considerations could include the allocation of agency
workload, personnel, and budgets. These policy considerations clearly embody “political”
choices. For example, when Congress allocates money to different agencies, it is engaging in
a political decision (e.g., should it give more money to fund environmental efforts or
financial sector regulation?).
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for greater accountability and monitoring. Furthermore, courts might be able
to decrease the likelihood that agencies will hide the ball by smoking out
undisclosed, extra-record political influences,252 as well as by penalizing
agencies for decisions that seem to be based upon undisclosed political
influences.253
C. Possible Sources of Political Influences
Besides trying to define a line that can assist in separating legitimate
political influences from illegitimate ones, it also is necessary to think about
potential sources of political influence. This Section considers political
influences coming from three possible sources: (1) direct presidential
involvement through executive orders, presidential directives, or more
informal presidential communications; (2) directives from other executive
officials, such as the Vice President or the President’s Chief of Staff; and (3)
congressional oversight and pressure from members of Congress. Ultimately,
this Section concludes that—if fully disclosed in the rulemaking record—all of
these sources of political influences serve as potentially valid sources.
1. Presidential Directives, Executive Orders and Other More Informal
Communications
Directions from the President expressed through Executive Orders,
directives, more informal communications, and “jawboning”254 all represent
prime sources of political pressure directed at agencies.255 Given the
prominence of the presidential control model today256 and given that the

252.

253.
254.

255.

256.

See Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 543-44 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the court
may consider extra-record materials where an agency decision was made in bad faith, such
as where the decision was tainted by impermissible political and ideological considerations).
See infra note 329 and accompanying text (discussing how courts presently are willing to
penalize agencies for basing decisions on undisclosed evidence or studies).
For an article on the role of jawboning in the administrative state and whether such ex parte
contacts should be limited, see Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980).
See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.9, at 497-503 (describing executive control over
agency rulemaking); Blumstein, supra note 147, at 863-70 (describing the history of
centralized presidential regulatory review); Kagan, supra note 4, at 2281-99 (describing
President Clinton’s exertion of control over administrative agencies through executive
orders and presidential directives); Verkuil, supra note 254, at 944-47 (analyzing White
House contacts with administrative agencies).
See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
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Constitution vests the executive power with the President and requires him to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”257 these sorts of presidential
directions aimed at executive policymakers could serve as a legitimate and
rational influence on agency decisions so long as the President does not seek to
prod the agency to act contrary to the relevant statute or contrary to existing
evidence. This means that a prime example of where presidential prodding
should be allowed to come into play is when agencies make value-based
judgments in the face of scientific uncertainty.258
For example, if the President communicated to an agency his desire to see
certain issues appear on the agency’s rulemaking agenda or to see certain
discretionary rulemaking proceedings treated with priority over other issues,259
the relevant agency should be able to explain its discretionary decision to move
forward with high-priority rulemakings and not to move forward with others
by reference to the President’s clearly expressed executive priorities.260
Similarly, if the President reached out to an agency and expressed his views
about how that agency’s policies might best fit together uniformly with the
policies set by other agencies, the agency should be able to explain its
policymaking decisions to a court by referencing its attempts to adhere to the
President’s desire for uniform, consistent regulatory policy.261 Both of these
sorts of influences coming from the President speak to policy-driven
judgments rather than raw partisan politics and thus can be understood as

257.
258.

259.

260.

261.
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U.S. CONST. art II, §§ 1, 3.
See Kagan, supra note 4, at 2356-57 (noting that agencies often must make value-laden rather
than expert-driven judgments and that a strong presidential role accordingly should be
appropriate where, for example, agencies “confront the question, which science alone cannot
answer, of how to make determinate judgments regarding the protection of health and
safety in the face of both scientific uncertainty and competing public interests”).
See, e.g., Statement on Federal Regulations on Privacy of Medical Records, 37 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 611, 612 (Apr. 12, 2001) (statement by President Bush directing Secretary
Thompson to “recommend appropriate modifications” to a medical privacy rule to address
concerns about the content of the rule).
Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg.
67,681, 67,686 (Nov. 19, 2004) (explaining the Department’s decision to remove a number
of rulemakings from its agenda in light of a reprioritization of the agency’s agenda that
flowed from the new Administration’s goals).
In denying the rulemaking petition that was at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007), the EPA did attempt to explain its denial in part by invoking a consistency and
uniformity rationale: it stressed that it wanted to avoid regulating in a piecemeal fashion
and stepping on the President’s own foreign policy initiatives. Id. at 513. The Court,
however, rejected this as an inadequate explanation for the agency’s denial of the petition,
noting that this and other explanations provided by the agency were “divorced from the
statutory text.” Id. at 532.
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rational policy explanations that legitimize (rather than taint) the agency
decision.
In addition, if the President campaigned on certain issues and thus came
into office perceiving certain electoral mandates that would serve the country’s
good, then the President likely would try to influence relevant agencies to act
accordingly. This may well have been what was really going on in State Farm.
There Reagan campaigned on the promise that he would respond to economic
woes plaguing the auto industry by getting rid of “several thousand” federal
regulations on American automakers,262 and the NHTSA under Reagan’s new
leadership ultimately rescinded the prior Administration’s passive restraint
regulations to better align with his promises and goals.263
Where, as in these situations, a perceived electoral mandate exists and the
President embraces the mandate by directing agency action in accord with the
mandate and within the confines of the relevant statutes, it would be entirely
reasonable for an agency to justify a decision based in part on the President’s
embrace of the mandate and for courts to accept that justification. In such a
situation, the President would be identifying the existence of the electoral
mandate that he believes serves the public good and accepting political
responsibility for implementing the mandate. Thus, the agency would not be
faced with the task of trying to read the political “tea leaves” on its own.
Rather, the agency would merely be seeking to align its own policymaking
decisions with the President’s own priorities, promises, and goals.

262.

263.

Lou Cannon & David S. Broder, Reagan Vows To Try To Halt ‘Deluge’ of Japanese Autos,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1980, at A2 (“Ronald Reagan campaigned for Democratic votes in the
recession-ridden auto capital today and said that as president he would try to get rid of
‘several thousand’ federal regulations on American automakers and move to halt the ‘deluge’
of Japanese auto imports.”); see also Lucia Mouat, Automakers’ Plea to Reagan Leadership: Less
Regulation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 26, 1980, at 6 (“Hopes are high among US
automakers that the Reagan administration will conduct an early, hard-hitting assault on
what they see as questionable and costly safety and environmental regulations affecting
them.”); Hedrick Smith, Republicans Gather in Detroit for Start of National Parley, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1980, at S1 (reporting that while Reagan was campaigning for President, he
released a “four-point economic recovery program keyed to the automobile industry and
aimed at using recession-bound Detroit to underscore the nation’s economic plight under
President Carter”).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the NHTSA’s change
in views “seem[ed] to be related to the election of a new President of a different political
party”). See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Dep’t of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 213
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that the NHTSA’s proposal of the possible rescission was
“announced by the White House Press Office on April 6, 1981, as part of a larger package of
economic recovery measures”).
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Of course, presidential prodding should not be allowed to help explain
agency action where the President directs an agency to act in a way that would
flout congressional will as set forth in the statute being implemented,264 or
where the President asks the agency to act in a way that would conflict with the
existing evidence. The results of some decisions are driven by science or law
and thus should be unconnected to political judgment.265 For example, it
would clearly be inappropriate for an agency charged with implementing a
statute that forecloses a cost-benefit analysis to apply a cost-benefit analysis
and to attempt to justify its decision by relying upon a presidential directive
asking it to look to economic efficiency.266 It would likewise be inappropriate for
a new Republican administration in the course of interpreting a statute that
requires price regulation to reject arguments for lower prices simply because it
doesn’t believe in price regulation. Conversely, it would be wholly appropriate
for an agency to justify a decision to consider economic costs in choosing Rule
A over Rule B where the President encouraged the agency to engage in a costbenefit analysis and where nothing in the relevant statute being implemented
precluded the agency from engaging in an economic cost-benefit calculation
(e.g., where the statute focused primarily on social benefits but was silent
about balancing economic interests).
2. Communications from Other Executive Officials
Directions from the President himself are not the only type of presidential
communications that agencies might reasonably rely upon: directions from
executive officials that have presidential authority behind them, such as

264.

265.

266.
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Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that an administrative
rulemaking may be overturned on the grounds of political pressure if “the content of the
pressure . . . is designed to force [the agency] to decide upon factors not made relevant by
Congress in the applicable statute” and if the agency’s determination was actually affected by
the “extraneous considerations”) (emphasis added).
See Kagan, supra note 4, at 2352 (noting that “some hesitation is warranted” in allowing a
presidential administration to influence agency decisions that are “most scientific or
otherwise technical in nature and, as such, least connected to political judgment”).
Cf. 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.9, at 501 (“OMB cannot order an agency to base its decisions
on a cost-benefit analysis . . . if Congress has explicitly required the agency to base its
decisions on a standard that is inherently inconsistent with that analysis.”).
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authorized directions from the President’s Chief of Staff267 or the Vice
President,268 also should be given a place.269
When President Bush entered office in January 2001, for example, his Chief
of Staff Andrew Card issued a memorandum to agency heads that, among
other things, directed them not to send any proposed or final regulations to the
Office of the Federal Register for publication “unless and until a department or
agency head appointed by the President after noon on January 20, 2001,
reviews and approves the regulatory action.”270 The memorandum also
directed agency heads to withdraw any regulations that had been sent to the
Office of the Federal Register but not yet published and to temporarily
postpone the effective date of any regulations that had been published but that
had not yet taken effect.271 Similarly, when President Obama entered the White
House, his Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel issued a memo to the heads of
executive departments and agencies halting the implementation of new and
proposed regulations.272 Even though these memos came from the Presidents’

267.

268.

269.

270.
271.

272.

See, e.g., Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of
Staff, to Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg.
7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).
See, e.g., Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 65 Fed. Reg. 73,453, 73,460
(Nov. 30, 2000) (noting that an initiative involving chemicals “was announced by the Vice
President on EPA’s Earth Day 1988 in response to the finding that most commercial
chemicals have very little, if any, publicly available toxicity information on which to make
sound judgments about potential risks”).
If an executive official issuing a directive to an agency is low ranking, it may be hard to show
that the official is actually speaking for the President or that the official is subject to
presidential control. See generally Verkuil, supra note 254, at 947 (noting that contact
between lower level aides and assistants “bears a heavier burden of justification since it is
more removed from direct presidential control”). This might undercut the rationality of an
agency’s reliance on the official’s directions since the official may not represent the views of
the President and may not be subject to political control and accountability.
Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., supra note 267.
This type of instruction to agency heads—to withhold proposed regulations when there is a
change in administrations—is quite common. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469
F.3d 826, 850 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Withholding proposed
regulations that are final but for publication in the Federal Register seems to be common
when there is a change in administrations.”), vacated, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
Marianne Koral Smythe, Judicial Review of Rule Rescissions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1928, 1931
n.18 (1984) (noting that “[o]ne of Reagan’s first actions on taking office was to impose a
60-day freeze on about 100” of the rules issued on the eve of Carter’s last days in office).
Upon entering the White House this year, President Obama continued this trend. See Jim
Tankersley, Bush-era Acts Elude Reversal by Obama, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2009, at 26 (“Like
Bush, Obama took office and immediately froze federal regulations not yet finalized.”).
See Memorandum from Rahm Emanuel, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009).
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Chiefs of Staff rather than directly from the mouths of the Presidents, they are
precisely the type of influence from the executive branch that—if openly
disclosed in an agency’s rulemaking proceeding—should be allowed to help
justify an agency’s decision, such as an agency’s decision to withdraw a
proposed rule.273
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) stands as
another possible source of nondirect presidential influence. OIRA is part of the
White House’s OMB, which assists the President in ensuring that “agency
reports, rules, testimony, and proposed legislation are consistent with the
President’s Budget and with Administration policies.”274 Although OIRA
generally exercises a type of supervisory authority over agencies by reviewing
regulatory decisions already initiated by agencies, OIRA in 2001 began to play
a role in directing agency priorities and prompting agencies to take action by
issuing “prompt letters.”275 Prompt letters are used to suggest OIRA’s view that
a particular matter needs agency attention, that a rulemaking proceeding needs
to be accelerated, or that an existing rule might call for rescission or
modification.276 Given that prompt letters communicate the views of the
executive branch to agencies in a transparent manner that permits public
scrutiny and debate,277 prompt letters further accountable and transparent
decisionmaking. Prompt letters, accordingly, serve as a very useful example of a
source of political influence that—if openly disclosed in an agency’s rulemaking
record—could appropriately and rationally help to explain an agency
rulemaking decision, such as a decision to modify or rescind an existing rule.

273.

274.
275.

276.

277.
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See Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg.
67,681, 67,686 (Nov. 19, 2004) (citing the Card Memorandum as a reason the agency had
reprioritized its agenda, resulting in a drop in the total number of rulemaking projects on
the agency’s agenda from 145 in the fall of 2000 to just 79 by the fall of 2003).
See OMB’s Mission, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_role (last visited Sept.
5, 2009) (describing the mission of OMB).
See Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration’s Use and Abuse of Rulemaking, Part I: The
Rise of OIRA, 28 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2003, at 8 (“OIRA has recently created,
out of no recognizable legal authority, the ‘prompt letter’—a letter written to an
administrative agency requesting that it take specific regulatory actions.”); see also Office of
Management and Budget News Release 2001-35, OMB Encourages Lifesaving Actions by
Regulators (Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/2001-35.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009) (describing how “[t]he prompt letter is a new tool created by OIRA’s
Administrator, John D. Graham, to highlight issues that may warrant the attention of
regulators”).
Introduction to the Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and
Deregulatory Actions, 70 Fed. Reg. 64,079, 64,087 (Oct. 31, 2005) (describing how “OIRA’s
first set of prompts suggested lifesaving opportunities at FDA, NHTSA, OSHA and EPA”).
Id.
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3. Congressional Oversight
The President and those who speak for the President are not the only
possible sources of political influences that might be aimed at agency
rulemaking decisions: Congress too plays an important role in overseeing and
shaping rulemaking decisions.278 Thus, particularly with respect to
independent agencies, congressional influences could serve as yet another
possible source of political influence that—if openly disclosed—could help to
adequately explain an agency’s rulemaking decision for purposes of arbitrary
and capricious review.
Members of Congress, for example, are free (just like any interested
member of the public would be) to file written comments with an agency
during a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding in an attempt to
influence the agency’s outcome.279 Alternatively, congressional committees
composed of certain members of Congress might hold oversight hearings to try
to prod an agency to act one way or another or to try to prod an agency into
action. In addition, certain members of Congress might choose to engage in
informal attempts to influence an agency, such as by simply calling up or
meeting with the decisionmakers at the agency and encouraging the agency to
act in a certain way.
Agencies are likely to pay attention to all of these different sorts of
congressional communications because it is, after all, Congress that ultimately
decides what powers to delegate to the agency and what type of funding the
agency will receive. However, whether agencies ought to pay attention to these
sorts of congressional influences (and whether such influences ought to be

278.
279.

See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
Because such comments are part of the rulemaking record and form part of the public
comments that agencies must adequately respond to when the APA applies, see 5 U.S.C. §
553(c) (2006), it is common to see agencies acknowledge the filing of such public comments
by congressmen. See, e.g., Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb,
Chicken, Goat Meat, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and
Macadamia Nuts, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,106, 45,114 (Aug. 1, 2008) (noting the receipt of “5,600
timely comments from consumers, retailers, foreign governments, producers, wholesalers,
manufacturers, distributors, members of Congress, trade associations and other interested
parties”) (emphasis added); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rearview Mirrors, 73
Fed. Reg. 42,309, 42,310 (July 21, 2008) (noting comments filed by two members of
Congress); Card Format Passport; Changes to Passport Fee Schedule, 72 Fed. Reg. 74,169,
74,170 (Dec. 31, 2007) (“Among those submitting comments were: four Members of
Congress, Senators Hillary Clinton and Charles Schumer of New York, Senator Patrick
Leahy of Vermont, and Representative Louise Slaughter of New York.”). Thus, agencies’
willingness to mention and discuss public congressional comments stands as an exception to
the normal rule that agencies will sweep political influences under the rug.
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brought out into the open) is likely to be more controversial than whether
agencies ought to be encouraged to openly rely upon presidential influences.
Specifically, two objections might be raised if agencies openly acknowledged
their reliance on congressional influences.
First, open reliance on congressional influences is likely to incite more
controversy than reliance on presidential influences because the current model
of agency decisionmaking often is described as hinging on the notion that
administrative agencies (and their place in our tripartite constitutional
structure) can best be legitimized by placing agencies under the President’s
control. In other words, allowing administrative agencies to resolve wideranging policy decisions is often viewed as justifiable not because of Congress’s
influence over agencies but rather because agency officials “are accountable to
the people through their relationship with the politically accountable
President.”280
Even “presidentialists,”281 however, do not claim as a factual matter that
Congress exerts no control over administrative agencies. To the contrary,
Congress (and individual congressmen as well as committees of congressmen)
play a significant role in overseeing the administrative state through formal
and informal mechanisms,282 and thus administrative agencies can be seen as
deriving their legitimacy from both the President and Congress. This means
that even if the presidential control model of agency decisionmaking is not
necessarily furthered by allowing congressional influences to explain agency
decisions for purposes of arbitrary and capricious review, the political control
model more generally certainly would be.
A second objection that could be levied against allowing congressional
influences to play an open role might revolve around the fact that the President
is a unitary official who can speak with one voice whereas Congress consists of
535 voting members. Put another way, it might be more difficult for courts to
determine precisely when congressional influences should be viewed as a
permissible explanation and when they should not be. In the end, the courts
likely would be faced with the task of assessing the weight due to congressional

280.

281.
282.

64

1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 1.7, at 26; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (noting that “[w]hile agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of Government to make such policy choices”).
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text; see also Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1076-78 (2001)
(discussing the mechanisms through which Congress exercises oversight over agency
rulemaking).
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influences on a case-by-case basis.283 In engaging in this case specific task, the
courts would need to deem some kinds of influences permissible and others
impermissible. For example, a group of congressmen’s comments on the
substance of a proposed rule (e.g., comments that help to explain Congress’s
intent in a particular statute) clearly should be found to fall on the line of
permissible considerations that might help to explain an agency decision.284
At the other extreme, one congressman’s “hard-ball” threats made through
the back door to an executive agency (e.g., a threat that if the agency proceeds
with a certain rule, the congressman will withhold all financial support for
other unrelated programs) should not be allowed to help adequately explain an
agency decision. Such an influence would not only fail to be a factor that
Congress intended to be logically related to the agency’s decision,285 but it also
would fail to reinforce the positive attributes of political influences, such as
representativeness and accountability.286 Similarly, comments made by
congressmen who were outvoted in writing the bill authorizing a rulemaking
would need to be ruled out or at least minimized when compared to comments
made by congressmen who served as conferees of the bill.
D. Types of Rulemaking Proceedings in Which Political Factors Might
Appropriately Play a Role
With an understanding of what types of political influences might most
appropriately count as valid factors justifying an agency’s rulemaking decision,
283.

284.

285.

286.

Although this might sound like a difficult task to impose on the courts, it is not all that
different from how courts currently give different weight to different types of legislative
history when construing statutes—giving more weight, for example, to committee reports
than to other types of legislative history. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7
(1986) (“We have repeatedly recognized that the authoritative source for legislative intent
lies in the Committee Reports on the bill.”).
Cf. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(noting that the agency relied upon comments filed by eleven members of Congress who
had served as conferees on the statutory amendments at issue).
Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 & n.539 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that it would
be improper for a congressman to exert pressure on an agency that would force the agency
to decide an issue based on “factors not made relevant by Congress in the applicable
statute”); D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(suggesting that it would be improper for the Secretary of Transportation to make a
determination that a proposed bridge should be part of an interstate highway system
because of a congressman’s statements to the effect that money earmarked for another
project would be withheld unless the Secretary approved the bridge).
Cf. EDLEY, supra note 4, at 196-97 (noting that political influences should be accepted as
“good politics” only where they “embody the positive attributes like representativeness and
accountability”).
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the final question to consider in terms of the mechanics of giving politics an
accepted place is this: In what rulemaking contexts might courts most
appropriately view agency reliance on political factors as a positive factor rather
than as a danger signal? Rulemaking decisions can arise in a variety of contexts
(both regulatory and deregulatory), including denials of petitions to initiate
rulemaking proceedings, the promulgation of final rules, the rescission of final
rules, and the withdrawal of proposed rules. Some types of rulemaking
decisions might be viewed as more appropriately turning on political influences
than others.287
1. Denials of Rulemaking Petitions
An agency’s denial of a petition asking the agency to initiate a discretionary
rulemaking proceeding presents perhaps the clearest example of a type of
agency decision that could very properly turn on political considerations.
Agencies are often given broad rulemaking powers yet given wide discretion to
decide whether and when to initiate rulemaking proceedings.288 Agencies,
however, may be prodded into action by interested parties who invoke Section
553(e) of the APA, which provides: “Each agency shall give an interested person
the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”289 If an
agency receives a petition asking it to initiate rulemaking proceedings but
ultimately decides to deny the petition, section 555(e) of the APA requires the
agency to give prompt notice of the denial, explaining the grounds for the
denial.290

287.

288.
289.

290.
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The only types of rulemaking proceedings considered here are rulemakings that would
count as informal proceedings. In other words, “formal” rulemaking proceedings subject to
sections 556 and 557 of the APA (rather than section 553) are not considered here because
section 557 expressly precludes ex parte contacts in the context of formal rulemaking. See 5
U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (2006) (prohibiting ex parte contacts); see also Verkuil, supra note 254, at
968 (discussing the prohibition placed on ex parte contacts in formal rulemaking
proceedings). Rulemaking today, however, overwhelmingly takes place under the rubric of
informal notice-and-comment rulemaking, not formal rulemaking.
Cf. Merrill & Watts, supra note 158, at 504-19 (discussing numerous statutes that give
agencies broad general grants of rulemaking power).
5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006). In addition to the default provisions of the APA, some statutes
specifically provide for a “right to petition for rulemaking, and some of these statutes specify
procedures to be followed in the petitioning process.” Petitions for Rulemaking
(Recommendation No. 86-6 n.1), 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-6 (1987).
5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006) (“Except in affirming a prior denial or when the denial is selfexplanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for
denial.”).
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Consistent with the prevailing technocratic and expertise-driven vision of
agencies’ reason-giving duties, agencies today tend to explain their denials of
rulemaking petitions not by openly mentioning influences from political actors
but rather by referencing the agency’s statutory authority, the underlying
statutory purposes, the desirability of proceeding on a case-by-case basis rather
than through generally applicable policy, the necessity or desirability of
statutory revisions, the lack of evidence of a problem warranting federal
intervention, and sometimes the availability of agency resources.291 For
example, even when the EPA denied the politically charged rulemaking petition
at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA,292 the EPA tried to explain its decision first in
statutory terms and only then in policy-driven terms that focused heavily on
alleged scientific uncertainty facing the agency.293 Mention was made of the
EPA’s desire to avoid stepping on the President’s own foreign policy initiatives
involving global warming;294 however, the EPA’s explanation of its denial of
the rulemaking petition—consistent with the prevailing expertise-based view
of agency decisionmaking—focused heavily on statutory as well as scientific
factors.295
Despite the current tendency of agencies to avoid justifying rulemaking
denials by relying upon communications from political actors, these sorts of
political influences are precisely the kinds of influences that might
appropriately help to explain an agency’s denial of a rulemaking petition. Just

291.

292.
293.

294.

295.

See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 490.6 (2009) (listing reasons why the Department of Energy might
deny a rulemaking petition); 11 C.F.R. § 200.5 (2009) (listing reasons that might explain
why the Federal Election Commission chooses to act a certain way on a petition for
rulemaking); see also Denial of Petition for Rulemaking; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,135 (proposed July 23, 1996) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571)
(denying the rulemaking petition, among other reasons, because of the lack of evidence of a
significant safety problem that would warrant federal intervention).
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Id. at 511-14; see also Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68
Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003) (“Although there have been substantial advances in
climate change science, there continue to be important uncertainties in our understanding of
the factors that may affect future climate change and how it should be addressed.”).
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 513-14; see also Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles
and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931 (noting that “the President has laid out a comprehensive
approach to climate change that calls for near-term voluntary actions and incentives along
with programs aimed at reducing scientific uncertainties and encouraging technological
development so that the government may effectively and efficiently address the global
climate change issue over the long term”).
But see Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,929 (discussing the President’s attempts to deal with climate change and noting that the
EPA did “agree with the President that ‘we must address the issue of global climate
change’”).
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as Congress must weigh competing interests and competing priorities when
deciding which issues to tackle via legislation, agencies faced with rulemaking
petitions asking them to regulate inevitably must weigh competing agency
priorities against limited agency personnel, budgets, and time.296 This sort of
priority-setting process is exactly the type of decision that political actors,
including the President, are likely to try to influence to ensure the consistency
of agency actions with overall government policy and priorities.297
To consider how this might play out, think once again about Judge Pollak’s
concurring opinion in UAW v. Chao.298 There, as you will remember, in 2003,
OSHA denied a rulemaking petition filed in 1993 asking it to promulgate a rule
that would have established a standard for metalworking fluids. Although
OSHA’s decision to deny the petition seemed inconsistent with the agency’s
prior 1995 decision to designate metalworking fluids as a high agency priority,
the Third Circuit ultimately upheld the denial of the petition, stressing that the
decision was not arbitrary and capricious “because OSHA weighed the scientific
evidence of health hazards . . . against its other regulatory priorities” and
“identified the reasons why regulating . . . [would] require an ‘enormous’
allocation of resources.”299 Judge Pollak’s concurring opinion took things a
step further: he agreed with the majority that the decision was not arbitrary,
but he explained that what was really at stake in the case was “a change in
regulatory policy coincident with a change in administration.”300 Specifically,
Judge Pollak highlighted the fact that OSHA’s counsel admitted at oral
argument that “‘[t]he metalworking fluids . . . were listed as a high priority
only following the priority-setting process of a prior administration . . . and
those priorities are different than the current ones.’”301
Judge Pollak’s willingness to credit what appears to be an oral, post hoc
justification offered by agency counsel (as opposed to requiring the agency to

296.

297.

298.
299.
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See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(“An agency’s discretionary decision not to regulate a given activity is inevitably based, in
large measure, on factors . . . [such as] internal management considerations as to budget
and personnel; evaluations of its own competence; [and] weighing of competing policies
within a broad statutory framework.”).
Cf. NHTSA Vehicle Safety Rulemaking and Supporting Research: Calendar Years 20032006, 68 Fed. Reg. 43,972, 43,973 (July 25, 2003) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571)
(“Agency priorities emanate from many sources, including . . . Executive initiatives, [and]
Congressional interest and mandates . . . .”).
361 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
Chao case).
Chao, 361 F.3d at 255.
Id. at 256 (Pollak, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting the attorney representing Chao).
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justify its decision based solely on the evidence and reasoning disclosed in the
agency’s rulemaking record) is not ideal in the sense that it undercuts open,
transparent agency reasoning. It also runs against the well-settled rule that
agency actions must be upheld based on the reasons actually articulated by the
agency itself, not by counsel’s post-hoc rationalizations for the agency.302 Judge
Pollak, however, was on the right track in terms of his general willingness to
acknowledge and embrace the role that political factors may play in agency
denials of rulemaking petitions.
Other judges too have at least implicitly recognized that political
considerations, such as changes in administrations or decisions about how best
to direct limited agency resources, play a role in agency denials of rulemaking
petitions.303 Generally, however, courts have allowed the political and policydriven influences swirling around rulemaking petitions to convince them that
when it comes to discretionary rulemaking proceedings, denials of rulemaking
petitions should be subject to only the most limited and deferential review.304
Courts, accordingly, have not thought to incentivize agencies to openly and
transparently disclose in their rulemaking records the political influences
bubbling under the surface of rulemaking denials. This should change. The

302.
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304.

See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)
(“[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action. . . .
It is well-established than an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis
articulated by the agency itself.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)
(noting that “an administrative order must be judged” solely “upon [those grounds] which
the record discloses that its action was based”); Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470 F.3d
71, 81 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Generally speaking, after-the-fact rationalization for agency action is
disfavored.”).
See, e.g., Chao, 361 F.3d at 255-56 (rejecting the claim that OSHA acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner in denying rulemaking petition where OSHA denied the petition in part
because OSHA has “limited resources” and where it named three “more pressing”
priorities); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(stating that “[a]n agency’s discretionary decision not to regulate a given activity is
inevitably based, in large measure, on factors not inherently susceptible to judicial
resolution,” such as considerations as to budget and personnel). But see Pub. Citizen Health
Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting the notion that competing
agency priorities could justify a nine year delay in adopting a new workplace exposure
standard).
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007) (holding that refusals to grant
rulemaking petitions are susceptible only to judicial review that is “extremely limited” and
“highly deferential” (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am. v. United
States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989))); see also Cellnet Commc’n, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d
1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[A]n agency’s refusal to initiate a rulemaking is evaluated with
a deference so broad as to make the process akin to non-reviewability.”); Am. Horse
Protection Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting deferential review that
applies when reviewing an agency’s refusal to initiate a rulemaking).
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decision about whether or not to regulate (i.e., to make law) is quintessentially
“legislative” in nature. Evidence and expertise, accordingly, may not be
dispositive in explaining such decisions—making it all the more appropriate for
rulemaking agencies acting as mini legislatures to rely upon political influences
when deciding whether or not to regulate in the first place.305
2. Withdrawals of Proposed Rules
Withdrawals of discretionary rules (i.e., rules that an agency is under no
statutory duty to enact) that have been proposed but that have not yet been
adopted provide another good example of a type of rulemaking that is
quintessentially legislative in nature and that might rationally turn on political
influences. Much like denials of rulemaking petitions, withdrawals of proposed
discretionary rules—especially the withdrawal of rules proposed under a prior
administration—may well turn on political calculations and influences, such as
administration priorities and overall agenda setting.306 Evidence and science
often will not be dispositive. This becomes quite clear when one considers how
common it has become for new presidents coming into office to order the
withholding of regulations proposed under the prior presidential
administration that are final but for publication in the Federal Register.307
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306.
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Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 117-18 (“We never say that Congress has a duty to pass a
particular law or indeed any laws at all. So an agency exercising Congress’s delegated lawmaking powers had no such duty either.”).
See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 850 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (“Absent a statutory duty to act, an agency need not adopt regulations, even if
all public comments submitted favor them . . . . The agency may decide not to adopt
regulations because of a change in administrations, or some other change in policy.”),
vacated by 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007); Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rulemaking, 69
Fed. Reg. 13,805 (Mar. 24, 2004) (“We have decided to terminate the rulemaking for the
administrative rewrite of headlighting requirements, due to other regulatory priorities and
limited agency resources.”).
See generally 469 F.3d at 850 n.6 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting the practice of presidents
coming into office and withholding final publication of regulations proposed under prior
administrations); Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1996) (“President Clinton,
following his inauguration on January 22, 1993, directed his newly appointed director of the
Office of Management and Budget to issue a memorandum requesting that each agency
withdraw from the Federal Register regulations that had not yet been published.”);
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 n.6 (D. Idaho 2001) (“On
January 20, 2001, President Bush issued an order postponing by sixty (60) days the effective
date of all of the Clinton Administration’s 11th hour regulations and rules that had not yet
been implemented.”); Dabney v. Reagan, 542 F. Supp. 756, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Shortly
after taking office, President Reagan directed the heads of all Executive Departments to
postpone all pending regulations.”).
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President Obama did this upon entering the White House in 2009, and
President Bush did the same thing in 2001.308
For a good example of how an agency might appropriately justify its
withdrawal of a proposed rule based on political considerations, consider
another example discussed earlier: the MSHA’s withdrawal of a proposed rule
that would have, among other things, “established permissible exposure limits”
and monitoring methods for substances that might adversely affect the health
of miners.309 In its detailed explanation of its rule withdrawal, the MSHA
explained that it had revisited and reprioritized the agency’s agenda consistent
with a “federal agency-wide initiative intended to maintain sound regulatory
practice,” which was announced by President Bush’s Chief of Staff Andrew
Card in a written memorandum to agency heads.310 Notably, in justifying why
this President-driven reprioritization should count as an “adequate”
explanation for its decision, the MSHA drew directly from the views Judge
Pollak set forth in his concurring opinion in Chao just one year earlier:
“‘[T]here is nothing obscure, and nothing suspect about regulatory policy
changes coincident with changes in administration,’” the MSHA explained,
quoting from Judge Pollak.311
3. Rule Rescissions
Rescissions of discretionary rules stand as another type of rulemaking
decision that might rationally and appropriately turn on political influences.
Some rule rescissions—rather than relying entirely on factual conclusions
about the ineffectiveness or obsolete nature of a rule—might appropriately
reflect the fact that a change in administration has taken place and that the new
administration does not wish to administer or enforce rules that run contrary
to its own political choices, goals, and policies.312 If an agency rescinding a rule
openly and transparently discloses its reliance on such political considerations

308.
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See Jim Tankersley, Bush-era Acts Elude Reversal by Obama, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2009, at C26
(“Like Bush, Obama took office and immediately froze federal regulations not yet
finalized.”). See generally supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the common
practice of presidents coming into office and issuing instructions to agency heads to
withhold regulations proposed under the prior administration).
See Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg.
67,681 (Nov. 19, 2004) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 56-58, 70-72, 75, and 90); see also
supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text (discussing the MSHA’s withdrawal of its rule).
See 69 Fed. Reg. at 67,686 (citing Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., supra note 267).
Id. (citing UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2004) (Pollak, J., concurring)).
See Smythe, supra note 271, at 1931-33 (describing how rule rescissions may be based in part
on political change).

71

WATTS_119_2.DOC

the yale law journal

119:2

2009

in explaining its decision to rescind the rule, then courts should embrace such
an explanation as rational rather than treating it as a danger signal.313
Take, for example, the “passive restraint” regulation rescinded by the
NHTSA at issue in State Farm.314 Although the agency failed to acknowledge it
openly, much of the explanation for the NHTSA’s rescission likely lay in the
fact that President Reagan had recently come into office, and he sought to
address the country’s economic woes by, among other things, achieving
“regulatory relief” for the ailing automobile industry.315 If the NHTSA had
openly disclosed its reliance on the Administration’s overall priorities in
explaining its rescission of the detachable belt portion of the rule, the agency’s
explanation should have been enough (combined with its focus on facts and
logic) to constitute a reasonable and adequate explanation for the rescission of
that portion of the standard.316 Similarly, had the NHTSA explicitly appealed
to presidential priorities in addition to any relevant studies or facts in dealing
with the possibility of an airbags-only option, then the NHTSA’s justification
for refusing to pursue an airbags-only option should have been viewed as
sufficient.317
4. Promulgation of Final Rules
A final (although somewhat messier) area in which political influences
might help to explain an agency’s decision involves the promulgation of final
rules. Clearly, if an agency is deciding between promulgating Rule A, B, or C
and the relevant statute, evidence, and science would support only the selection
of Rule A or B but not Rule C, then the agency should not be allowed to rely
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See McKarcher, supra note 132, at 1369-70 (“There is nothing patently arbitrary or capricious
about a newly elected administration exercising congressionally delegated discretion to
implement [new] policy choices [that were] debated publicly for months or years leading up
to the President’s election and presumably motivated the majority of voters to support the
President eventually elected.”).
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
See Smythe, supra note 271, at 1933 & n.32; cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the change in presidential
administration).
Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 n.* (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that a change in presidential administration is a perfectly reasonable basis for
reappraising a rule and noting that in this case, “Congress has not required the agency to
require passive restraints”).
The NHTSA’s downfall in the case, of course, was that it entirely failed to consider an
airbags-only option. See Smythe, supra note 271, at 1933-35 (discussing how the NHSTA’s
problem was its failure to meet even its minimal obligation to explain its rule rescission); see
also supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
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upon political considerations alone to select Rule C. Put another way, political
considerations alone should not be allowed to justify the promulgation of a rule
that conflicts with the existing evidence or with the statute itself.318 Allowing
this would be to allow naked politics to trump science and/or to trump the law.
However, if the relevant statutory provisions and the evidence would equally
support the selection of either Rule A, B, or C, then it would be entirely rational
for the agency to rely upon political influences in explaining why it chose Rule
C over Rules A or B.
A harder case might be presented if the relevant statute and evidence
strongly supported the selection of Rule A but did not entirely foreclose the
possibility of Rule B. In such a situation, could an agency rely upon political
considerations, such as a presidential directive, in explaining why it ultimately
chose Rule B over Rule A? The answer to this question should vary depending
on the circumstances of the particular case involved. One relevant
consideration would be the certainty of the factual evidence; the more
uncertain the science, the more room for political considerations to tip the
scales. Other very relevant considerations would be the content, form, and
perceived significance of the political influences. For example, a publicly
announced presidential directive ordering an agency to promulgate Rule B
because it better aligns with the administration’s goals and comprehensive
strategies should be viewed as much weightier and more capable of properly
tipping the scales toward Rule B than a mere phone call made by a single
congressman. This is because the presidential directive would help to reinforce
positive attributes of politics, such as accountability and representativeness,
whereas the congressional phone call would not.
iv. objections to giving politics a place
The proposal that courts add political factors to the list of “valid”
justifications for agency decisionmaking is open to criticism on a number of
grounds. Five possible objections are considered here. Ultimately, however,
none of them prove insurmountable.

318.

Cf. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2356-57 (arguing that a strong presidential role is inappropriate
where the agency decision is purely scientific in nature but is appropriate where agencies
confront value-laden judgments that must be made in the face of “scientific uncertainty and
competing public interests”).
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A. The First-Mover Dilemma
One major roadblock that could prevent politics from gaining an accepted
role in rulemaking involves what could be thought of as a “first-mover”
dilemma, or perhaps a type of “chicken-and-egg” problem.319 The specific
dilemma is this: either courts or agencies will have to be the first mover. Will
courts indicate a willingness to embrace political factors before agencies have
openly started disclosing their reliance on politics, or will agencies need to
move toward disclosing political factors first without knowing ahead of time if
courts will accept such factors? Given how expensive and time-consuming the
rulemaking process is today, agencies might well be unwilling to render their
decisions vulnerable to attack by openly disclosing political factors without first
knowing whether courts are likely to embrace political considerations.
Likewise, courts might be disinclined to send abstract signals to agencies on the
issue, or perhaps courts would view it as inappropriate to speculate in dicta
about how they might handle a situation that may or may not come along in
the future.
Perhaps the simplest solution to this problem would be for a bold agency to
set aside its fears and to decide to act as a “guinea pig” by openly relying upon
political factors in a rulemaking proceeding, thereby giving the courts an
opportunity to embrace politics. At first blush, this solution might seem quite
improbable given the risks of reversal that the agency would be accepting. Yet
upon closer examination, the solution may not actually be all that improbable.
One reason why is that agencies should have an incentive to see politics
affirmatively embraced as an appropriate factor in rulemaking decisions: if
courts accept political factors under arbitrary and capricious review, then
agencies will gain yet one more reason why they can claim an entitlement to
deference by the courts.
To play it safe, agencies might well want to begin by relying upon political
factors in narrow situations where courts are more likely to see the value of
political judgments—such as denials of rulemaking petitions or withdrawals of
proposed rules based upon clearly articulated administration priorities (such as
a presidential directive ordering an agency to withdraw a proposed rule that
conflicts with the administration’s goals and comprehensive strategy).320 If
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See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 192 (using the term “chicken-and-egg problem”).
Cf. UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (Pollak, J., concurring) (embracing
change in administration as a valid reason supporting agency decision in the context of an
agency’s denial of a discretionary rulemaking petition); Air Quality, Chemical Substances,
and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,681, 67,686 (Nov. 19, 2004)
(explaining the withdrawal of the proposed rule by noting that “each administration
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agencies can get courts to routinely accept political factors in those specific
contexts, then they might feel more comfortable testing the waters in broader
contexts later on.
Another reason why it actually might not be all that implausible to see
agencies begin to openly rely upon political factors is that some judges and
agencies already have begun to plant the seeds for giving politics some place in
agency decisionmaking.321 Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Fox, which suggests willingness on the part of at least some
members of the Court to allow political influences to play some role in agency
decisionmaking.322 Or take Judge Pollak’s concurrence in the Third Circuit’s
recent Chao decision discussed earlier.323 In Chao, Judge Pollak signaled his
willingness to embrace politics, and at least one agency (the MSHA) has
already relied upon Judge Pollak’s view that “there is nothing obscure, and
nothing suspect about regulatory policy changes coincident with changes in
administration.”324 Or consider the final rule adopting fuel efficiency standards
recently issued by the NHTSA under the Obama Administration, which openly
acknowledges the role that presidential directions and goals played in the
agency’s decision-making process.325

321.

322.
323.
324.
325.

embraces its own priority-setting process and regulatory philosophy such that items
considered priority by one administration may not be so by another administration”).
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Chao, 361 F.3d at 256 (Pollak, J., concurring); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated
policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon
the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”); Sierra Club
v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The court recognizes the basic need of the
President and his White House staff to monitor the consistency of executive agency
regulations with Administration policy.”). But see Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519,
547 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting in the context of review of an FDA decision involving the
emergency contraceptive Plan B that there was “unusual involvement of the White House”
and that this was “not the norm”).
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
See Chao, 361 F.3d at 256; see also supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
Chao case).
See Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 67,686 (citing Chao, 361 F.3d at 249 (Pollak, J., concurring)).
See Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74
Fed. Reg. 14,196 (Mar. 30, 2009).
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B. Balancing The Carrot With A Stick
Some might object to the proposal set forth here because the “carrot”
offered to agencies (i.e., the additional reason for deference) is not balanced by
a “stick.” Agencies, in other words, are given the best of both worlds: they
could choose to disclose political influences when it would help give them an
additional reason to claim deference, or they could choose to ignore political
influences when such influences might be viewed as improper. For example,
agencies might be more willing to disclose publicly available directives from
the President and less willing to disclose back door congressional pressure that
could be viewed as inappropriate political meddling.
The clearest way to solve this problem might well be to create an express
“stick” to affirmatively require agencies to disclose political influences. Such an
affirmative disclosure requirement, however, would mean that courts would be
forced to attempt to determine when political communications did occur and
when they did not occur. This would be difficult for courts to do—at least in
today’s statutory environment—given that section 553 of the APA does not
require that informal, ex parte communications, such as communications from
the White House to executive agencies, be docketed in notice-and-comment
rulemaking records.326 Thus, an affirmative requirement that agencies disclose
political communications would likely require an amendment to the APA or the
enactment of a new statute that affirmatively requires disclosure of certain
political influences, such as significant executive supervision. Certainly, this
type of statutory disclosure requirement is a possibility. Professor Nina
Mendelson, for example, argues in a forthcoming article that such an
affirmative disclosure requirement would be superior to addressing the issue of
politics solely through judicial review.327 However, such a statutory change
would likely face various hurdles—including claims of executive privilege.328
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As the D.C. Circuit has explained, the APA prohibits ex parte contacts only “in an
adjudication or rulemaking ‘required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing.’” Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist. v. Mar. Adm’n, 215 F.3d 37, 42 (2000)
(citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a), 557(d) (2000)). It, accordingly, would likely violate
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978), if courts instructed agencies to disclose all ex parte contacts from political actors in
informal rulemaking proceedings. See Dist. No.1, Pac. Coast Dist., 215 F.3d at 43.
See Mendelson, supra note 123, at 4, 39 (“[R]ather than addressing the issue [of politics]
indirectly through judicial review, I suggest that we proceed directly to regulating procedure
[by requiring] . . . that a significant agency decision include at least a summary of the
substance of executive supervision.”).
See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.9, at 502 (noting that Congress has “considered
passage of a statute that would require public disclosure of all communications between
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Even if a new statutory requirement forcing agencies to disclose political
influences does not materialize anytime soon, courts might nonetheless be able
to create a type of “stick” to balance the “carrot” by essentially penalizing
agencies for decisions that seem to be based upon undisclosed, secret political
influences—akin to how the courts presently are willing to penalize agencies
for making decisions that seem to be based upon undisclosed expert studies or
evidence.329 This, for instance, could be what happened in State Farm. There,
the NHTSA failed to acknowledge political influences and thus the Court’s
opinion could be read as saying that the “agency had not provided the full
story” and that the agency should be forced to “reveal the political basis for its
decision” so that it also would consider “the opposing political position.”330
C. Judicial Dislike of Agency Politicization
Another major hurdle that might stand in the way of giving politics a place
involves what could be described as some judges’ normative judgments that
the politicization of agency decisionmaking is dangerous.331 As Professors
Freeman and Vermeule have explained, this general concern—that bad things
may come from the politicization of agencies—may very well have been what
drove the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA to force the EPA to exercise its
expertise.332
If it is true that most judges truly believe as a normative matter that the
politicization of agencies is a bad thing, then judges will be unlikely to give
politics an accepted role in agency rulemaking. There is good reason, however,
to doubt that most judges truly believe that any politicization of agencies is a
bad thing. In light of Chevron’s acknowledgement of the role politics can play
in agency decisionmaking and other signs that judges are well aware of the

329.
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OMB and the agencies it ‘regulates’” but that “Congress’ ability to require such disclosure
may be limited to some uncertain extent by the doctrine of Executive Privilege”).
See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1977)
(concluding that the agency acted improperly in failing to disclose scientific research upon
which the proposed rule was based); see also EDLEY, supra note 4, at 190 & n.34 (describing
as an analog “those cases in which courts have rejected agency decisions that seem[] to be
based on secret or undisclosed expert studies or reasoning”).
Bressman, supra note 142, at 1783.
Cf. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 94 (describing how the Court’s treatment of
some cases is “tinged with underlying suspicion about politically motivated executive
usurpation of judgments normally left to experts”).
See id. at 93-95 (viewing Massachusetts as part of a judicial pattern demonstrating the Court’s
discomfort with seeing “executive override of expert judgments by professionals or
agencies”).
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influences political actors can have on agency decisionmaking,333 judges are not
likely to believe that political influences should completely be kept out of
agency decisionmaking.334 Rather, it seems far more likely that judges want to
avoid seeing too much politicization of agencies, not that they want to avoid
seeing any politicization at all. Thus, judges—even those judges who are
skeptical of political influences—might well be willing to modify existing
judicial doctrine to encourage agencies to openly disclose political influences in
appropriate circumstances. Doing so would empower courts to ensure that
political factors are being used in an appropriate fashion, not to covertly distort
science or to suppress politically inconvenient evidence.
In addition, bringing political influences out into the open might deter
courts themselves from covertly making their own political decisions under the
guise of applying arbitrary and capricious review. A significant amount of
literature criticizes arbitrary and capricious review by suggesting that the
results turn on the political and ideological beliefs of the judges applying the
doctrine.335 This concern that judges are manipulating hard look review to
reach results that fit their own ideological predilections could be remedied, or
at least reduced, by requiring agencies openly to disclose political factors
influencing their rulemaking decisions. If an agency openly disclosed political
factors that influenced its rulemaking decisions (such as a presidential
directive) in its rulemaking record, then the reviewing court would have to
grapple openly with the political factors influencing the agency’s decision,
making it much harder for the court simply to substitute surreptitiously its
own policy views under the guise of legal constraints.
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See supra notes 158-170 and accompanying text.
See generally Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 108-09 (noting the Court must view it
as “inevitable that political considerations will come into play in executive agencies headed
by political appointees who are accountable to the President”).
See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008) (providing evidence indicating that judges’ own ideologies play a
role in judicial review of agency decisions for arbitrariness); Pierce, supra note 125, at 908-09
(citing “[n]umerous studies [that] have found that the results of hard-look review depend
primarily on the political and ideological beliefs of the judges who apply the doctrine”);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV.
1717, 1719, 1769-70 (1997) (concluding that “ideology significantly influences judicial
decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit” and discussing how this may call into question the
benefits of hard look review).
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D. Separation of Powers Concerns
A fourth possible objection involves separation of powers concerns. As the
administrative state grew in the post-New Deal world, the courts condoned
huge transfers of legislative-like powers to administrative agencies by, for
example, allowing the nondelegation doctrine to become a toothless
doctrine.336 The death of the nondelegation doctrine now means that agencies
often enjoy an unlimited number of actions that they might permissibly take
when implementing vague, broad statutory commands. Hard look review’s
insistence on expert-driven decisionmaking can be thought of as a judicial
“check” against this large power transfer to agencies and as a judiciallyimposed check on political decisionmaking. By enabling courts to engage in
fairly aggressive judicial review, hard look’s reason-giving requirement allows
courts to ensure that agencies are engaging in expert-driven decisionmaking
consistent with Congress’s instructions.337 Courts, accordingly, can more easily
maintain the fiction that agencies are not actually exercising “lawmaking”
powers at all but rather are merely “implementing” or “executing” Congress’s
instructions.338
If courts were openly to accept political judgment as a valid factor
supporting agency rulemaking decisions, then courts might have more trouble
continuing to maintain the fiction that agencies are simply “executing” or
“implementing” laws set by Congress. Rather, courts would at least implicitly
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See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1237-40 (1994) (describing the “death” of the nondelegation doctrine and noting that
“the Supreme Court has not invalidated a congressional statute on nondelegation grounds
since 1935”).
Cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487 (1989) (noting that “the permissibility of delegating
regulatory power” has hinged on the courts’ ability to police and check agency exercises of
delegated power); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,
1987 DUKE L.J. 387 (1987) (arguing that State Farm’s heightened reason-giving requirement
flows from separation of powers principles and responds to the broad delegations of
legislative authority given to agencies).
Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (explaining that the text of the
Constitution permits “no delegation” of legislative powers but does permit executive actors
to make policy decisions in the context of executing or applying the law set down by
Congress); id. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring) (accusing the Court of “pretend[ing]” that
legislative power is not actually being delegated); Travis H. Mallen, Rediscovering the
Nondelegation Doctrine Through a Unified Separation of Powers Theory, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 419, 432 (2005) (noting that the sole test for impermissible delegations—the
“intelligible principle” test—“advances the fiction that administrative rulemaking is not an
exercise of legislative power when it does not involve too much discretion”).
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need to recognize that agencies are making political judgments and thus are
acting essentially as mini legislatures engaged in the process of lawmaking.339
Those who believe in a robust and vigorous nondelegation doctrine might find
this change to be quite objectionable given that they believe only Congress has
the power to legislate. Most, however, embrace a much more pragmatic or
functionalist take on the nondelegation doctrine and openly accept that
agencies play a lawmaking role.340
Furthermore, even under the version of hard look review proposed in this
Article, hard look review would continue to ensure that agencies engaging in
lawmaking functions remain faithful to congressional intent and to existing
evidence and facts. In this sense, hard look review would continue to function
as a constraint on political decisionmaking.341 It would operate to ensure that
political judgments do not play an inappropriate role: political judgments alone
would not be allowed to trump or to nullify congressional intent set forth in a
particular statutory scheme, nor to justify an administrative decision that runs
contrary to existing evidence.
E. Difficulty of Judicial Review
A final potential objection—and perhaps the most serious objection—
involves questions about whether judges are capable of and whether they
would be comfortable with the notion of subjecting political influences to legal

339.

340.

341.
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Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 171 (“Agencies ought to be allowed to act and to admit that
they act as subordinate legislatures making a good deal of law within broad congressional
constraints and in the face of considerable uncertainty about facts and diverse and changing
political sentiments.”).
See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I am persuaded that it would
be both wiser and more faithful to what we have actually done in delegation cases to admit
that agency rulemaking authority is ‘legislative power.’”); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 758 (1996) (noting that the nondelegation principle “does not mean . . . that only
Congress can make a rule of prospective force”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
372 (1989) (“[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our
increasingly complex society . . . Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power . . . .”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-98 (1985) (arguing that accountability concerns
tip in favor of broad delegations to agencies); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I,
Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2170-71
(2004) (arguing for an exclusive delegation doctrine under which Congress has the exclusive
power to decide when and whether to delegate lawmaking powers).
Hard look’s purpose, in other words, would not be to constrain political decisionmakers by
ensuring that decisionmakers are forced to make decisions based solely on technocratic and
scientific factors. But hard look review would operate to ensure that political influences are
playing a proper role.
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discipline.342 As the D.C. Circuit has aptly explained, judges, unlike members
of Congress or the President, “are insulated from [political] pressures because
of the nature of the judicial process in which [they] participate.”343 Thus, it
may be tempting for judges to try to force agency rulemaking decisions into an
adjudicatory mold and “to look askance at all face-to-face lobbying efforts,
regardless of the forum in which they occur, merely because [judges] see them
as inappropriate in the judicial context.”344
Evidence of judges’ relative discomfort with assessing the political factors
that feed into legislative-like decisions can be seen in many different places. For
example, the judiciary’s desire to force federal agencies into an adjudicatory
mold of agency decisionmaking is evident in how the judiciary has “moved us
from a vision of rule making as quasi-legislative to one of rule making as quasijudicial by requiring all kinds of new adjudicatory style procedures in
rulemaking,”345 including the detailed reason-giving requirement embraced by
State Farm.346 In addition, various nonreviewability rules, such as Heckler v.
Chaney’s rule that nonenforcement decisions are not judicially reviewable,347
suggest that the courts will sometimes refrain from scrutinizing executive
decisions that they perceive to turn on factors ill-suited to judicial review, such
as a lack of agency resources.348

342.

343.
344.
345.
346.

347.

348.

See generally EDLEY, supra note 4, at 189 (“It might be claimed that by ignoring politics the
courts are able to escape the difficult problem of assessment and balancing that might be
thrust on them were the veil lifted . . . .”).
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id.
SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 118.
Cf. Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246-48 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the courts for expanding arbitrary and
capricious review from a narrow test into a “far more demanding test” that leads to
unpredictable results).
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review
of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1667-69 (2004)
(discussing Chaney’s decision to insulate agency failures to enforce from judicial review).
See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 848 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (“[A]n agency may choose not to adopt discretionary regulations for a variety
of reasons, many of which a court can’t review: a change in policy; a lack of enforcement
resources; a lack of scientific expertise to address the problem at this time; a change in
direction based on a determination that the problem is better addressed some other way.”),
vacated by 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (noting that review of denials of rulemaking petitions is constrained because “[a]n
agency’s discretionary decision not to regulate a given activity is inevitably based, in large
measure, on factors not inherently susceptible to judicial resolution—e.g., internal
management considerations as to budget and personnel; evaluations of its own competence;
weighing of competing policies within a broad statutory framework”) (internal citations
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It is true that this Article’s proposal inevitably would force courts to cast
aside some of their current discomfort with politics. Changing the judicial
mindset, however, may not be as difficult as it sounds. In many situations,
judges would not actually need to “weigh” political factors against science and
evidence but rather would merely be called upon to acknowledge the factual
existence of a rational and legitimate political influence. This might be the case
where an agency declined to initiate a completely discretionary rulemaking
proceeding or decided to withdraw a draft of a discretionary rule based entirely
on its adherence to known presidential priorities and preferences (e.g., “we
decline to grant the rulemaking petition because the President wants to develop
a comprehensive strategy to the problem” or “we decline the rulemaking
petition because the President wants to be able to negotiate a global solution to
the problem”). Here, the reviewing court would not need to evaluate the merits
of the President’s preferences but rather would merely need to acknowledge
the factual existence of such preferences and to determine that the agency’s
reliance on these priorities in setting its own discretionary rulemaking agenda
was rational.
It might also be the case that no value-laden weighing of political
influences against facts and evidence would be required where an agency used
political influence as a “tiebreaker” of sorts to help it choose between multiple
factually supportable and statutorily permissible options (for example, where
political influences pushed an agency to choose Rule B rather than Rule A
where the statute and the science before the agency supported Rule A and B
equally). In this situation, a reviewing court would not be called upon to weigh
the merits of the political influences against the weight of the existing evidence
but rather would simply be called upon to assess as a factual matter whether
the agency was correct to claim that rational and legitimate political influences
supported the selection of one factually and legally permissible rule over
another.
Where things would be much more complicated for judges are those
situations in which the science before an agency strongly supports one answer
(Answer A) but neither the statute nor the science clearly foreclose another
answer (Answer B). Here, if an agency chose Option B instead of A because B
was most closely aligned with political influences, such as a presidential
directive instructing the agency to promulgate Option B because the President
believed Option B best balanced the costs and the benefits in a way that would

omitted); see also EDLEY, supra note 4, at 180-81 (discussing how political influences are
sometimes “acknowledged as a reason to treat the agency’s discretion as unreviewable, and
hence immune to legal discipline”).
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maximize the public good, then a reviewing court would be faced with directly
weighing the political influences against the evidence before the agency.
In assessing the weight to be given to a given political influence, courts
likely would need to take into account both the content and the form of the
political influence. The content of the political influence would be relevant
because, as discussed above, not all political influences should be treated as
equal.349 Rather, courts will need to draw lines between permissible and
impermissible political influences. Given courts’ general desire to force agency
decisionmaking into an adjudicatory mold that resembles judicial proceedings
sanitized of political influences, courts are not likely to be entirely comfortable
with this line-drawing task. In addition, they may not believe they have the
capacity to evaluate or weigh certain political judgments. Yet just because
courts do not have much experience identifying and weighing political
influences does not mean that courts should give up on the task.350
Furthermore, as discussed above, defining valid “political” factors as those
influences coming from political actors that speak to policy judgments or
value-laden judgments rather than raw partisan politics should go a long way
toward easing courts’ discomfort with the notion of giving “politics” a place.351
In addition to taking the content of political influences into account when
assessing the weight to be given to a given political influence, courts also would
need to take the form of the political influence into account. As Edley has
suggested, some political influences may be articulated in a form designed to
reinforce some of the positive attributes of politics, such as accountability,
public participation, and representativeness, whereas other influences may be
articulated in a form that underscores the negative attributes of politics, such as
willfulness and tyranny of the majority.352 If courts pay attention to the form of
the political influences relied upon by an agency, then courts can ensure that

349.

350.

351.
352.

See supra Section III.B. In her forthcoming article, Professor Mendelson has reached a
similar conclusion about the importance of the content of political influences. See
Mendelson, supra note 123, at 4 (arguing that whether presidential influences on agency
decisions help to increase or decrease legitimacy depends “on the content of that influence”).
Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“As judges . . . we must refrain
from the easy temptation to look askance at all face-to-face lobbying efforts, regardless of
the forum in which they occur, merely because we see them as inappropriate in the judicial
context.”); SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 171 (arguing that judges need to remember “what rulemaking agencies are” and need to stop treating them “as if they were courts instead of
subordinate legislatures” free to make law in the face of “diverse and changing political
sentiments”).
See supra Section III.B.
See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 21 fig.1; cf. id. at 196-97 (arguing that politics should be accepted
as “good politics” only where the political influences “embody the positive attributes like
representativeness and accountability”).

83

WATTS_119_2.DOC

the yale law journal

119:2

2009

the positive aspects of politics are reinforced. Such an approach would likely
mean that agency reliance on publicly announced presidential directives or
publicly available “prompt letters” issued by OIRA could be viewed as
permissible (depending on the content of the directives and letters), whereas
agency reliance on backdoor political tactics would be viewed as impermissible
because such influences fail to reinforce notions of accountability,
representativeness, or public participation.
conclusion
The judiciary’s current formulation of arbitrary and capricious review,
which focuses on whether agencies have adequately explained their decisions in
technocratic rather than political terms, has incentivized agencies to hide
behind technocratic façades. Expanding current conceptions of arbitrary and
capricious review beyond its singular technocratic focus—so that credit also
would be given to certain influences from political actors that an agency openly
and transparently discloses and relies upon in its rulemaking record—would
yield many significant benefits. Such a move would better harmonize arbitrary
and capricious review with other major administrative law doctrines, such as
Chevron deference, which seem to embrace the political control model of
agency decisionmaking. Such a change would also enable political influences to
come out into the open, thereby facilitating greater political accountability. In
addition, it could lead courts to defer to agencies more often, thereby offering a
means of softening the “ossification” charge frequently raised against arbitrary
and capricious review. Finally, encouraging agencies to disclose political factors
could help to create a more effective separation between science and politics.
Despite the benefits of giving politics a place in arbitrary and capricious
review, the success of the expanded conception of arbitrary and capricious
review proposed here ultimately will rest in the hands of courts and agencies.
Agencies will need to become comfortable openly acknowledging influences by
political actors and explaining their decisions in both technocratic and political
terms, and the courts will need to acknowledge that an agency’s reliance on
influences from political actors that involve policy considerations and value
judgments can help to provide a reasonable, nonarbitrary explanation in the
rulemaking context. Although certainly this calls for significant change on the
part of agencies and courts, there are signs that such change might not be all
that far off. The Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
for example, suggests that at least some members of the current Court might
be ready to acknowledge a role for political influences in agency
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decisionmaking.353 Similarly, the NHTSA’s recent rule setting fuel efficiency
standards for cars and light trucks could serve as a sign that agencies under the
Obama Administration might more readily acknowledge and disclose
presidential oversight.354

353.
354.

See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
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